National politics and interethnic relations. collapse of the USSR

2.4.1. The USSR was unitary federation with a strictly unified, centralized system of public administration. It included 53 national-territorial entities - union and autonomous republics, autonomous regions and districts. According to the censuses of 1979 and 1985. 101 ethnic groups were identified. The basis of this national-state unity was the CPSU. The party committees of the national republics were only its regional branches. At the same time, the bureaucratic centralism of the party system made the national elites reliable components of the unified power structure of the CPSU.

During the years of Soviet socialism, conditions were created in the USSR for the development of nations. Ethnonational groups were guaranteed territorial autonomy, the formation and operation of cultural institutions in national languages, as well as the creation of local personnel and their own national nomenclature - clans (one of the factors of the future disintegration process on the territory of the USSR).

In this situation, the national question in the USSR was considered resolved completely and finally (the victory of socialism automatically excluded the possibility of national conflicts and contradictions on the territory of the Soviet state). This was supported by the thesis about the creation of a new international community - the Soviet people.

Russians in the USSR, who made up 51.3% of the total population and occupied 3/4 of the territory of the USSR, did not enjoy any advantages over other nations and nationalities. Moreover, in the RSFSR there has never been a republican communist party and the corresponding central bodies of its government (there was no Russian Central Committee). For this reason, the sphere of direct (from the CPSU Central Committee) control extended to the Russian Federation. This led to the fact that the center of the union state was associated with the Russians, and the concept of an older and younger brother entered into the nature of the relationship between the republics.

2.4.2. Hidden causes of interethnic conflicts.

At the same time, during the years of Soviet power, ethnic minorities in a number of republics (especially Transcaucasian, for example, in Georgia in relation to the Mingrelian and Svan languages, in Azerbaijan Kurdish and Lezgin) were subjected to assimilation and discrimination by the titular nations. This was also the reason for future interethnic conflicts (Armenians against Azerbaijanis in Karabakh, Ossetians against Georgians, etc.). Changes in the boundaries of autonomy and the discrepancy, as a rule, between ethnic settlement and political statehood led to territorial disputes between ethnic groups, which caused future conflicts between Chechnya and Dagestan, Chechnya and the Cossacks, Ingushetia and North Ossetia, etc.

The national minority (younger brother) complex, as well as Russian acculturation, came to the fore by the end of the 80s. national problems come to the fore.

2.5. Spiritual life of society in the 70s. was complex and contradictory . On the one hand, pomp and dogmatism, the ideologization of science and culture, on the other, a slow but inevitable growth of protest. The thaw did not pass without a trace; the iron curtain became less dense.

2.5.1. The gap between ordinary citizens and those in power became wider and wider, social stratification increased, which negatively affected the spiritual state of society. It grew in him social apathy, blossomed double standards, as above, so below.

2.5.2. If in the working environment this was manifested in absenteeism, drunkenness, and anecdotes about the country's top leadership, then among the intelligentsia, unspoken criticism of the Soviet system and discussions in private conversations about the problems of the political, social and economic situation in the country became characteristic.

The most radical, although least massive expression of disagreement and protest was dissident movement. Among its ranks were representatives of the creative intelligentsia, national minorities, and believers. By the second half of the 60s. refers to the emergence of the human rights movement, of which the academician became an active participant HELL. Sakharov. On its basis, the Human Rights Committee in the USSR was created; Moscow Helsinki Group, Christian Committee for the Rights of Believers, etc.
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Dissidents organized protests (in particular, in connection with the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia) and tried to organize the production of illegal literature. Further, the main form of their activity became protests and appeals to the country’s top leaders and law enforcement agencies (such as, for example, A.I. Solzhenitsyn’s Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union). Despite its small numbers, dissidence posed a moral and ideological threat to the system.

As a protective measure by the authorities at the suggestion of the KGB Chairman Yu.V. Andropova The Fifth Directorate of the KGB was created specifically to combat dissidence, and used in its arsenal arrests, prosecutions, deportations abroad, and referrals for treatment to psychiatric hospitals. At first, open trials were still used (as, for example, over writers A. Sinyavsky And Y. Daniel in 1966 ᴦ. and etc.). But in the 70s. the persecution of renegades was not advertised; their deportation abroad was increasingly practiced.

The laudable desire to show Russian history as a harmonious and beautiful chronicle of the succession of victories played a bad joke with patriotic thought. The emphasis on the inheritance of the USSR in relation to the Russian Empire often leads to an inability to distinguish between them, even where these systems diverge radically. All the features of the USSR (especially Stalin's) are shamelessly attributed to the Empire, and the USSR turns out to be the heir to all conceivable traditions of the Empire.

In particular, it became common to assert that in the Empire something like a “Soviet people” was created - a “common imperial multi-ethnic civil nation” or, as the “old” patriots of the 1980s liked to say, “Russians from time immemorial lived side by side with others peoples, mutually enriching cultures...". As evidence, the relatively diverse national composition of the population and elite is cited, at least since the late Middle Ages.

As a result, some argue that the Russian State, almost since the time of Ivan Kalita, has been anti-Russian in nature, while others see in any “event” of Soviet power an unconditional expression of the national spirit. Meanwhile, few things are as different as national politics in the USSR and the Russian Empire. Expanding its borders, the Empire included more and more new territories inhabited by very different peoples. According to the established point of view, all these ethnic groups “were included in the Russian world”, “fell into the orbit of Russian culture”, etc. In fact, no obligatory mechanical “switching on” or “hitting” occurred.

Rather, we can say that there was a chance for such a rapprochement, and even then not always. And so, in the life of the “ordinary person” from foreigners, few significant changes took place. No one forced him to dress in Russian clothes, speak Russian, live in Russian huts, etc. On the contrary, often the new authorities were interested in preserving traditional “beliefs and customs” to the great pleasure of the local nobility. Not only the cultural, but even the legal space of the “outskirts” often remained untouched. Family, property and in many ways criminal law remained the same as before the arrival of the Russians. Naturally, this tribal right extended only to the members of the tribe themselves.

No one raised special national cadres of bureaucrats or officers from the local elite. There was no question of the power and laws of any ethnic group being extended to this or that territory in such a way that any Russian would fall under their influence.

(Striking contrast with the situation in the current autonomies, isn’t it?)

Here we need to remember not only that for the state nationality did not officially exist; religion was indicated in the documents. Something else is more important. For a traditional society, being, say, an Evenk (Georgian, Russian, Kyrgyz, etc.) is not really a question of the “passport nationality” of the parents. This also means living among the Evenks and like an Evenki: speaking this language, getting food for yourself exactly as your fellow tribesmen do, believing in what they believe in, wearing the same clothes, obeying the same rulers. Anyone who did not follow this was not a member of the tribe, neither in the eyes of others nor in his own. It is practically impossible to preserve such a national identity beyond the boundaries of traditional settlement. This is a kind of reservation, the first, but not the last line of preserving the national character of the Russian state. If so, then a person who, for one reason or another, broke these ties with his tribe-community, in essence, no longer belonged to it. He was becoming a loner, seeking recognition in a new environment as one of his own - a “Russian Georgian” (Russian Kyrgyz-Kaisak, Russian Buryat, etc.), whom patriots so often cite as an example, painting the image of a “good foreigner.” “Going beyond the outskirts,” getting an education, and often simply crossing the city limits meant, to a large extent, the acceptance of the Russian rules of the game, and, what is very important, this state of affairs was perceived as natural, and not introduced by the arbitrariness of the authorities.

By the way, the concept of a “native” is a response to the argument against the national state, beloved by internationalists of all shades: “What about Gergiev (Gubaidullina, Bockeria, Isinbayeva, Bagramyan, etc.)? Why shouldn’t these talented people have any success because they are not Russian?” The point is not that we could somehow cope (although the work of these people is worthy of respect). In a national state, it simply did not occur to them to consider their nationality “relevant” - “the Kabardians remained in the village, but here you have to be Russian.”

However, a slight nostalgia for the “dear homeland” was rather encouraged, because complete indifference to the memory of ancestors and “father’s coffins” was read as moral deformity, which, in fact, it is.

Digressing from the topic: within the framework of such a “multidimensional” understanding of nationality, the interpretation of nationality adopted in the USSR looks completely ridiculous. " Blood" did not equal "nation". The phrase “I am three-quarters Russian, and one-quarter Udmurt” - in such a “paradigm” looks like nonsense. In that system of ideas, what makes this person non-Russian is a cockroach in his head, which tells him that one can supposedly be an Udmurt without living a day or an hour in Udmurtia, among the Udmurts and as an Udmurt, and that one can supposedly be free from belonging to the Russian nation and from obligations to her even if you were born and raised in Russia and among Russians.

The second frontier was the somewhat “exclusive” nature of the Russian socio-political system. Russian society was centralized by class, and the least complimentary foreign societies were often (and even as a rule) tribal, clan-based. The transition from one society to another meant nothing less than a transition from one physical environment to another. Namely, try to play in this “other world” by the rules.

Clan society with its nominal, but clearly institutionalized kinship between the highest and the lowest, of course, in a number of its manifestations, looks quite nice, which influences the positions of some Russian nationalists (all kinds of calls to “become Chechens”). But the clans have always been powerless against the working regular class system - “my machine is iron-built, it will grind and spit out bones.” Suffice it to recall the example of the confrontation between class England and clan Scotland. However, this is a topic for a very separate conversation.

In the sources available to me, the final destruction of clan structures in Rus' is attributed to the 15th-16th centuries (almost earlier than anyone else in Europe, where the relics of this system lingered for centuries and were embodied in some democratic institutions). The fact that it was during this period that Russia first clanged half of Europe with its heavy armor is by no means a coincidence: the system acquired the necessary resources to begin creating one of the greatest Empires in history. It is generally accepted that Russian imperial know-how was the inclusion of ethnic elites in the Russian nobility. In fact, the completeness of this inclusion depended on the readiness to abandon the previous role of the ethnic elite and to prefer class to ethnic group. I will give an example of the last Khan of Nakhichevan. This highly worthy officer chose a strategy for existing in Russian society that excluded the “prolongation” of his national identity in future generations: he was married to a Protestant, and his children were baptized in Orthodoxy. There would be very little “Nakhichevan” left in his descendants, except perhaps a slightly flirtatious pride in the exoticism of the “root”.

The local prince, of course, had every opportunity, say, to give his son a good education. But this did not lead to the “indigenization” of local officials or police officers. A newly minted, for example, graduate of the cadet corps from a foreign nobility had a much better chance of ending up in the garrison of Helsingfors or Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky than returning, invested with power, to the “native Palestines.” Peoples unfriendly to the Russians, for whom the “technology” of existence in a class society is not was something difficult, they came under conditions of direct administrative restrictions (for example, the Pale of Settlement for Jews, unspoken restrictions for Poles).

A separate topic is cities. A significant part of the peoples of the Russian Empire did not have their own urban culture at all. The cities located on the lands inhabited by these tribes were Russian outposts, outposts both in the literal, military sense, and outposts of culture, religion, education, etc. The city, being strikingly different in everything, imperiously demanded a renunciation of its identity from the usual way of life and accepted only those who were capable of such a renunciation. There was practically no “ethnic component” in the education system. The University and the Gymnasium were Russian, if you like, Russian, but not as institutions designed to codify (and often simply create from scratch), develop and disseminate any other culture other than Russian. It is clear that where the education system existed before the arrival of the Russians, this rule had some exceptions. Needless to say, no one specifically raised “national cadres” in order to transfer power over the nominally “non-Russian” territories of the Empire into their hands. The state did not create ethnocracies included in the general administrative mechanism.

In general, the desire of foreigners to make a career or get an education found support from above only if certain conditions were met. Somewhere in the press I came across a story about a very gifted either Buryat or Tuvan youth. In the second half of the 19th century, he graduated from high school and came to the attention of military orientalists (at that time, oriental studies throughout the Old World was largely in uniform). They find him extremely promising, he continues his studies and receives an officer rank. To begin a full-fledged career, he, a Buddhist, must convert to Orthodoxy. Refusal - and his brilliant rise was interrupted: the prudence of the system did not allow him to give the green light to a person with low loyalty. One can dispute the fairness of this particular measure, but it cannot be denied that social advancement must be linked to the level of loyalty to the state.

There is a phrase from one German (I’m afraid I’ll be wrong, but I think it’s Thomas Mann): “For an Italian, another is a stranger, for a Frenchman – a barbarian, for a German – an adversary, for an Englishman – a competitor, for a Russian – a heretic.” This does not poorly describe the peculiarity of the meeting between Russians and foreigners; they (in the absence of another invasion) often come in the form of an intellectual phenomenon, some kind of “ungodly book,” and even with “disgraceful pictures.” And so, it’s as if they don’t exist. The Russians generally there was no neighboring people, no competing people, with which one would have to measure oneself in the course of everyday coexistence, “to be on the alert.” Pardon the pathos, but we can say that the only “neighbor” whose gaze the Russians always felt was the Lord, “from time immemorial, my Bright Rus' borders on God.” God of Truth. Let me make a reservation for non-Orthodox readers: I am now analyzing not mystical, but ethnopsychological reality.

That is why, by the way, nationalism, relatively speaking, of the “Krylovian” kind is difficult to accept by many Russian people with any traditional consciousness... what is foreign must be appropriated or destroyed, at worst reviled and ridiculed, simply because it is not one’s own. After all, what does this kind of nationalism tell us in a nutshell: “Others are watching and listening, Others are already here, everything you say, do, etc. can be used against you. God, perhaps, does not exist, or He is not at all like what you were told, and what is the use of believing in the God of Truth and Eternity, and not in the Patron of Russians? But the Others, they definitely exist, and they are here, and they are against you.” And why, a Russian person asks such a Russian nationalist, should he always lie, not say a word “as is true”, “as it is”? Never - such a nationalist answers, well, perhaps those elected at the secret Sanhedrin of Russian Sages will be able to afford it, but without a protocol, so as not to repeat the mistakes of others. I'm exaggerating, of course, but that's roughly how it is. But okay. From our days, let's return to the Russian Empire. In a certain sense, it can be said without much stretch that no “other peoples” lived in Russia.

Of course they lived in different parts of the Empire, that's true. Some foreigners lived in the Turkestan province, and others lived in the St. Petersburg province. The Russians from these units, to one degree or another, came into contact with these ethnic groups, had an idea about their way of life, mentality, culture, behavioral characteristics, but information of this kind did not extend beyond the borders, as they would say now, of “regions”; "there was no request." And it didn’t exist because in that system, within Russia itself, there was no ethnic group capable of being a “challenge” to the entire Russian nation as a whole (even the Jews approached this role only at the beginning of the twentieth century).

The Russians themselves, if they actually found themselves in a situation of life “side by side with many nationalities,” turned into stiff-necked, warlike, energetic and united Cossacks, i.e., they activated in themselves the very qualities that were obscured and even unnecessary in monoethnic Indigenous Russia. Moreover, what is extremely important: the Cossacks were class, because in a class society, mechanisms of solidarity operate only within social groups. When reproaching today's Russians for the weakness of tribal ties and the lack of ethno-favoritism, we must remember that the very situation of the appearance of foreign diasporas in Russian cities and villages is too new for our nation. And the call to “learn from the Chechens” sounds even more stupid. We need to learn from the Cossacks, since the Cossack lies dormant in each of us.

The image of very few peoples of the Russian Empire was present in the minds all nation in any way intelligible. These are, first of all, the “Germans”, the Tatars (“interpreted” quite widely), partly the Poles, perhaps the French (the memory of 1812 and the trace of numerous near-Bar “Musyas”), and only from the middle of the 19th century do the “highlanders” appear. I repeat - Russians as a whole never perceived themselves as living side by side with any “others”; there was no sense of the presence of a “foreign gaze”, this special challenge posed by otherness, moreover, the otherness of a conquered stranger (unlike, say, Austrians, who perceived this challenge from the Italians, Czechs, Hungarians and others as a whole nation). And even more so there can be no talk of perceiving one’s country as a derivative of some “union of tribes.” By the way, this is why the Russians did not turn out to be arrogant gentlemen, “not enough practice.” But there was an extremely stable attachment to their way of life, little subject to the influence of their neighbors. One’s own way of life was perceived as “the only norm,” at least on one’s own land. This order of things ensured the Russian state a national character, albeit somewhat official-power uniform. True, it is precisely this uniformity that the Empire is often reproached for.

I’m not going to engage in an apology for Peter’s “breaking over the knee,” but, gentlemen, an empire is an empire. Let us assume that Peter’s modernization would have taken place without the grave excesses of “Europeanization,” but, I assure you, by the century, say, the 19th century, there would have been no more folkloric ethnicity in Russia than in the kingdom of the “last knight of Europe,” Nicholas the First. For the empire is the business of officials and officers. You love to exist among the first, at the very forefront of history - you love both the elastic energy of the corridors of the capital’s departments (“forty thousand couriers alone”), and the sleepy spirit of provincial offices. The fact that these venerable institutions could be called orders and zemstvo huts would not change much. A warm tribal community built largely on poorly formalized connections on a Russian scale would not have survived. Did this system fail? Yes.

One of them, a very large one (although not clear in its consequences), was called “German dominance.” Apparently, by the 16th century, the German Settlement had given birth to a full-fledged “ethnic mafia,” which not only took advantage of the fruits of Peter’s reform, but also in many ways prepared it itself.

These were, of course, somewhat arbitrary “Germans”, quite diverse in national composition, but people from German states who had not found use in their homelands made up the majority among them. I note that there were dozens of these states and even, in some periods, hundreds [!]. By the way, hello to the crocodile Shiropaevites who dream of dozens of “free Rus.” We find a good description of the functioning of such mafia connections, as it may seem strange to some, in Dostoevsky:

“Andrei Antonovich von Lembke belonged to that favored (by nature) tribe, of which in Russia there are several hundred thousand according to the calendar and which, perhaps, itself does not know that in it with its entire mass it constitutes one strictly organized union. And, of course, , a union that is not premeditated or fictitious, but exists in the whole tribe on its own, without words and without an agreement, as something morally obligatory, and consisting in the mutual support of all members of this tribe, one by one, always, everywhere and under any circumstances circumstances, Andrei Antonovich had the honor of being brought up in one of those higher Russian educational institutions that are filled with youth from families with more gifted connections or wealth. The students of this institution, almost immediately after completing the course, were appointed to occupy quite significant positions in one department of the civil service. Andrei Antonovich had one uncle, a lieutenant-colonel engineer, and another, a baker; but he made it to high school and met quite a few similar fellow tribesmen. He was a cheerful comrade; He studied rather stupidly, but everyone loved him. And when, already in the upper classes, many of the young men, mainly Russians, learned to talk about very high modern issues, and with such an air that if they just wait for graduation, and they will settle all matters, Andrei Antonovich still continued to engage in the most innocent schoolboy activities ..."[F. M. Dostoevsky “Demons”]

Forgive the extensiveness of the quote, “everything is fine here”... One way or another, the stupid German nephew, who impedes the career growth of a gifted Russian, will become an iconic figure in Russian life for almost two centuries. But this medal also has a flip side. It is impossible to say about more than one people who took part in the construction of our Empire: “without them the country would have been different.” You can talk about the Germans. It is rather stupid to deny the contribution of some representatives of other nations, but the measure, degree, and characteristics of influence among the Germans are an order of magnitude higher. Let's say that General Bagration is an extremely worthy example of courage, but to say that without the Georgians Russian military affairs would have looked completely different would be a gross exaggeration. This can be said about the “Germans” - without the “Leforts” the appearance of the Russian army would have been significantly different. The same can be said about many other areas of state building: administrative culture, science, etc. Better or worse is still a question, but there is no particular doubt that without the “Germans” the Empire would have been different. It is characteristic that in great Russian literature the presence of “Germans” is much less significant. Fet, for example, can be “removed” without collapsing the entire “building” and without noticeably changing its appearance.

Another, and very significant, departure from this order of things was the existence of two “quasi-states” - the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Finland. A story about them is beyond the scope of this article, but it should be noted that these were territories where relatively developed statehood and elites capable of governing their countries had formed before the arrival of the Russians. Moreover, with the annexation to the Russian Empire, these elites were subordinated to the authorities appointed from St. Petersburg and far from being from among the “indigenous personnel.”

So, the peculiarities of the situation in the sphere of interethnic relations in the Russian Empire can be reduced to several points:

1. A format of national identity that did not imply its preservation outside traditional settlement and significantly complicated ethnofavoritism.

2. Preservation of culture, traditional way of life and, in some cases, customary law of small peoples without transferring to them sovereignty over any territories in the form of state entities.

3. The inclusion of people from the national nobility into the all-Russian elite is only subject to dissolution in it.

4. Social growth is subject to a visible demonstration of loyalty to the state.

5. “Exclusive” form of social structure of Russians.

6. “Monoethnic” self-awareness of the majority of Russians.

7. A general imperial education system that did not involve special training of national personnel.

8. The city is like an outpost of the Russian world.

9. Cossacks as a mode of existence of Russians in close proximity to other peoples.

10. The situation with the national question (as with many other “issues”) was predominantly presented not as the result of an arbitrary “national policy” of the authorities, but as a consequence of the natural order of things. However, in many ways she was like that, which was both her strength and her weakness.

The slogan “the right of nations to self-determination” was present on the banner of the Revolution from its very origins. If you wish, you can easily create a concept according to which the main meaning of, say, the events of 1917 was not the “change of socio-economic formations” familiar to everyone from school, but the struggle of national minorities against the Empire. Perhaps in the near future there will be a request for this kind of theory.

Let me make a reservation right away: I have an idea of ​​the volume and versatility of the topic and in no way pretend in this note to be an exhaustive completeness of presentation. I will briefly outline only my vision of nation-state building in the USSR. From the first years of Soviet power, a conveyor belt for the creation of socialist republics and autonomous entities was launched. In fairness, it must be admitted that in a number of cases the basis for this existed long before 1917.

Firstly, there were nations that had their own state formations in the past (but there were not many of them). Secondly, by the end of the 19th century, separatist-minded groups of intellectuals began to appear in many corners of the Empire, and, characteristically, they were almost always closely associated, first with populist and then with social democratic circles. But the creation of “socialist nations” on the basis of ethnic substrates with extremely weakly expressed self-awareness and a poorly formed culture, with no clear “internal demand” for their own statehood, was not uncommon.

At the same time, I would not attach much importance to the discussions on issues of national-state structure that were going on at that time within the top of the CPSU (b). Both the plan for the creation of the Union, which Lenin insisted on, and the “autonomization” proposed by Stalin and Dzerzhinsky were based on a common basis. Neither side questioned the need to divide the territory of Russia into unique “zones of responsibility” (if not to say “zones of occupation”) between the newly created ethnocratic regimes.

The scope of powers of these ethnocracies is a secondary issue - the genie cannot be “let a little out of the bottle”, it will all come out. If we ignore the fact that this was done in my country and with my country, then the scale of the work done is perhaps even admirable. From peoples and tribes at different levels of development, the never-before-seen “Nichennel Building” industry began to hastily fashion “socialist nations” that have all the signs of highly developed ethnic groups with their own statehood. There are amazing examples when, in the shortest possible time, a national alphabet was created among pre-literate ethnic groups, and just a few years later they already had a branch of the Writers’ Union with dozens of members, their own newspapers, teachers of “native speech,” etc. Enormous, comparable only to the construction projects of the first five-year plans.

During the so-called “language construction in the USSR”, about 50 previously unliterate peoples received writing. . Suffice it to recall the work of the New Alphabet Committee at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee or the creation of a written language for many peoples of the North (for example, the alphabet for the Evenki language was developed in 1931 based on Latin script, and already in 1936-37 it was translated into Cyrillic with the addition of special characters)

The “factory of nations” worked non-stop; it is difficult to find even examples of attempts to curtail its activities. True, they can give me, as a counter-argument, the fact that the “tops” of the new-found republics “during the period of repression” were subjected to serious cleansing, and several peoples were deported, but is there much sense in this? The history of a nation is measured not by years or centuries, but generations. If you destroy the ethnic elite every six months, you can bring to life a mass experience of a rich and tragic history in a few years. This is what seems to have happened as a result: the new generations of “ethno-elitist” who replaced them carried within themselves not so much gratitude to the power that gave birth to them, but rather the bitterness hidden for the time being of the heirs of their unavenged fathers (despite the fact that they themselves acted as executioners and their henchmen). The very principle of the existence of states within a state, with obvious privileges for “titular nationalities,” remained unshakable.

We must not forget about something else: the construction of Soviet nations often ignored the cultural and mental characteristics of the “source” ethnic groups. What could have grown into something very original over hundreds of years took shape in a few years into a typical “brotherly people.” It looks like a mass move from huts and yurts to standard, albeit comfortable, cottages.

Although the level of independence strongly depended on the status of the “subject” (union republic, autonomous republic, autonomous district, etc.), we can say that the set of features of such political formations coincided. It was an expanded ethnocracy, with its political and administrative elite, its humanitarian and (if possible) scientific and technical intelligentsia, its police officers, teaching staff, its media, etc.

The fact that these ethnocracies had different statuses and different amounts of powers should be recognized rather as a destabilizing factor, inevitably giving rise to destructive ambitions. A bomb for the future, not as terrible as the very existence of these elites themselves, but still. But a detailed description of Soviet nation-building would take many volumes, and this is just a sketch.

Why was this done?

If we leave aside discussions about the mystical background of the destruction of the Russian people, which may scare off religiously indifferent readers, it is worth dwelling on several points. Each of them complements in some ways, and in some ways contradicts the other, but together they form a picture, which, in my humble opinion, is quite a bit lacking in integrity. But if you imagine that the motives outlined below could be the basis for activities on different floors of power pyramids and at different times, it becomes even clearer. For a complete picture, of course, empirics and open sources alone are not enough, but I’m trying.

1. In themselves, the hundred or more peoples called to state-building were of secondary interest to the “young Soviet government.” They were supposed to provide the source material for the creation of a large army of partyocrats-administrators and “fighters of the cultural-propaganda front”, tightly tied to their “teachers”, and completely alien to the memory of the Russian Empire, its tradition, its glory, its pain and, most importantly, alien Russian.

And to a certain extent this was successful. For example, in terms of creating national intellectuals. The peaceful coexistence of authors with Jewish and “Muslim” surnames on the pages of liberal publications fighting “Great Russian chauvinism” is a guarantee of this. By the way, against this background, the exhortations of some Russian publicists, calling on Jews to come to their senses and see among the intelligentsia, for example, Caucasians, “the most zoological anti-Semites,” look somewhat naive against this background. As long as this cooperation is mutually beneficial, it is unlikely to be overshadowed by anything. The surreal world is painfully pleasant, where “reporter of a progressive publication” sounds proud, but “officer” or “scientist” does not.

2. At the same time, in order to understand why some peoples take a hostile position towards the Russians, while others do not, it is necessary to analyze according to what scenario the formation of their “new elites” took place, what were their relationships with the former “masters of life” and in what historical moment they were created. I don’t presume to say for sure, but it seems that the most aggressive are those “tops” that were created earlier (in the wake of total revolutionary negation) and in which there was a mimicry of a significant part of the former nobility into “secretaries of party committees.”

3. In my humble opinion, there is no particular doubt about the sincerity of the internationalist convictions of a significant part of the Soviet leadership. And this is understandable: the tendency towards behavioral and psychological unification of proletarians of different countries was evident. Why not believe that the process would only increase further? And why was it not assumed that since John, Hans, Todeusz and Ivan, dressed in work overalls, acquire some similar features over time, the same should happen to Mustafa, Kazbek and Ali if they were put at the machine? It is logical that in order to achieve such changes, it was necessary to overhaul the entire social structure of peripheral ethnic groups in the shortest possible time and according to a single model, including the need to have at any cost a similar percentage of proletarians, engineers, etc. 2 . It is known that the greatest originality (often interpreted as “backwardness”) is characteristic of ethnic groups that do not have complete independence, but exist on the periphery of larger nations and states. Consequently, to combat “backwardness” at least partial independence is necessary. So to speak, the withering away of the nation through its strengthening. Very dialectical.

4. The danger of counter-revolution was perceived by the Soviet government (at least until the Victory, which changed everything) as quite real. Two conclusions follow from this circumstance:

1) The authorities needed to create a counterweight to the Cossacks in the form of national republics

2) You need to protect yourself from the possibility of collusion between counter-revolutionaries and the old ethnic elites. For this, the elites had to be replaced and “reformatted”, thanks to a change in lifestyle and education, the foreign environment should become “transparent” for propaganda, and foreigners should have compelling reasons for loyalty to the new government.

5. Any power system, and especially an ideocracy, has things that it is forced to do, even if they have no practical value or are directly harmful. The empire could tolerate in its composition even peoples at the slave-owning stage of development, hesitating whether to leave these ethnic groups in “their natural state” or begin a leisurely enlightenment. For the USSR, the existence of citizens who were not involved in the values ​​and benefits of socialism was something unacceptable, at odds with the system’s basic idea of ​​a person, and a recognition of its (the system’s) failure.

What is the result?

Let's briefly go through 10 points that describe (in my humble opinion) the situation in the field of national politics in the Russian Empire and see how the situation in this area differed in the USSR. The picture is almost completely opposite.

1. R.I.: The format of national identity, which did not imply its preservation outside traditional settlement, and significantly complicated ethnofavoritism.

THE USSR: Socialist national identity could easily be prolonged “throughout life.” Moreover, all kinds of “orders” stimulated the preservation of this identity, opening a “green street” for representatives of the “oppressed peoples” to enter the powerful and privileged strata. It was denied that “blood” carries any “information load” with the exception of minor things such as temperament. As a consequence, there are all the conditions for ethnofavoritism, the organized occupation of the most “interesting” social niches, because “we are all Soviet people.”

2. R.I.: Preservation of culture, traditional way of life and, in some cases, customary law of small peoples without transferring to them sovereignty over any territories in the form of state entities.

THE USSR: Most of the country is divided between “autonomies” of different levels, in which the right of representatives of the “titular nation” to occupy a privileged position in government, the media, etc., compared to Russians, was strictly implemented. At the same time, the way of life of “ordinary people” has undergone significant transformations, which ultimately gave rise to the current waves of the “new great migration” (see also paragraph 5).

3. R.I.: The inclusion of people from the national nobility into the all-Russian elite is only subject to dissolution in it.

THE USSR: Indigenization of personnel, creation and cultivation of their own “elites”, “intelligentsia”, etc.

4. R.I.: Social growth is subject to a visible demonstration of loyalty to the state.

THE USSR: Here the situation is more complicated. On the one hand, the Soviet state demanded evidence of loyalty like few others. Almost every citizen in one form or another took the oath to the USSR, many did this more than once - at the age of 7, 9, 14 and 18, joining the next ranks. On the other hand, loyalty had to be shown not even to the country, but to the regime and ideology, and certainly not to the people who created this huge state. Russians living on the territory of autonomous ethnocracies were required to demonstrate loyalty not only to the USSR as a whole, but also to these regimes, studying “titular” languages ​​in schools, obeying “indigenous” customs, putting up with actual inequality, etc.

When in the 1950-70s a tendency arose, especially among urban representatives of Central Asian and some other ethnic groups, to abandon their own identity in favor of the Russian one, the authorities sounded the alarm. The situation is also twofold: on the one hand, the idea of ​​preserving the integrity of these peoples can be called correct. After all, for such “new Russians” the attractiveness of “Russianness” was rather in the fact that you can not listen to old people, not do the same work as your ancestors, go to discos and sleep with whomever you want. Those. the price of this “assimilation” is not high, but the losses could be significant, because If this trend continued, a shortage of workers was expected in cotton farming, sheep breeding, reindeer husbandry and other industries based on centuries-old traditions. But on the other hand, the cure was almost worse than the disease, additional funds began to be pumped into the national republics from the center, and nationalist propaganda, wrapped in cotton wool of Marxist phraseology, became more and more outspoken. The problem of loyalty of the peoples of the USSR towards the Russians was not even raised by the Soviet government.

5. R.I.: “Exclusive” form of social structure of Russians.

THE USSR: Maximum unification, which destroyed the traditional way of life of both the Russian and other peoples, gradually making all barriers transparent to strangers. At the same time, the ethnic self-awareness of the “brotherly peoples” (unlike the Russian one) not only did not erode, but, on the contrary, its growth, encouraged in every possible way, was observed.

6. R.I.: “Monoethnic” self-awareness of the majority of Russians.

THE USSR: Everything, starting with the Soviet coat of arms and ending with a songbook for kindergarten, where there were even Azerbaijani songs, everything testified to the Russian that he lives not in a Russian, but in a multinational state, however, everyone around him is “the same Soviet people.” In the information space, the “culture of the peoples of the USSR” was very widely represented. At government concerts, various “folk dance ensembles of the A-ya-Stan USSR” immediately followed numbers from the classical repertoire, a sign of the highest recognition in that hierarchy. And in ordinary times, every day on Soviet TV one could see either a lezginka, or shamans with tambourines, or hear the drawn-out chant of a zurna

7. R.I.: A general imperial education system that did not involve special training of national personnel.

THE USSR: Huge amounts of money were spent on the codification (if not creation) and development of national cultures. Higher and secondary educational institutions in national formations and even in the center gave priority rights to education to representatives of non-Russian ethnic groups, thus encouraging the creation of closed national elites, communities in power, media, etc.

8. R.I.: The city is like an outpost of the Russian world.

THE USSR: Russian cities on the national outskirts, often with a glorious history, were transferred under the control of national elites, turned into the capitals of union and autonomous republics, often renamed in order to erase the very memory of their founders. Just a few examples: Yoshkal-Ola was founded as the Kokshaysk fortress in 1584 . by decree of Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich after the annexation of the Mari lands to the Russian state. Grozny was founded in 1818 as the Grozny fortress by order of General A.P. Ermolov, which, as the most important link in the Sunzha fortified line, blocked the mountaineers’ access from the mountains to the plain through the Khankala Gorge. Frunze (now Bishkek) - the city was founded in 1864 as the Russian military settlement of Pishpek. Makhachkala – the city was founded in 1844 as Peter’s fortification. The name is due to the fact that, according to legend, during the Persian campaign, the army of Peter I camped here in 1722. Since 1857, this has been the city. Petrovsk-Port. The list, as they say, goes on.

9. R.I.: Cossacks as a mode of existence of Russians in close proximity to other peoples.

THE USSR: The tragic fate of the Cossacks under Soviet rule can be retold for a long time. A significant part of the territory of both national autonomies within the Russian Federation and the republics of the former USSR are Cossack regions where Russian people lived for centuries.

10. R.I.: The situation with the national question (as with many other “issues”) was predominantly presented not as the result of an arbitrary “national policy” of the authorities, but as a consequence of the natural order of things. However, in many ways she was such, which was both her strength and her weakness.

THE USSR: Everything that happened began to be perceived as a consequence of certain government decisions, and therefore, any unsatisfactory moment seemed easily changeable, given the presence of levers of pressure on the authorities. Such levers appeared in the late 80s, it all ended with the collapse of the USSR...

What happened next has already happened and is happening before our eyes...

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In 1986, the XXVII Congress of the CPSU categorically stated that the national question in the USSR had been completely resolved. However, in 1988, opposition forces in the Baltic states headed for the secession of their republics from the USSR. At the same time, a conflict broke out in Transcaucasia between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the issue of ownership Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia insisted on including it into its republic; the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug, who made up 80% of its population, advocated for this. Azerbaijan opposed the territorial redistribution of its republic. The conflict took the form of a bloody and protracted war. Azerbaijanis began to leave Armenia, Armenians - Azerbaijan. The number of refugees in Transcaucasia soon exceeded 300 thousand. Many of them became victims of terrorist attacks and direct armed conflicts. The Union leadership turned out to be helpless in the conflict, which became the first source of the future all-Union fire. In the spring - summer of 1990, the Baltic, and after them other republics of the USSR, including Russia, adopted declaration of national sovereignty, actually opposing itself to the union state. National sovereignty was soon transferred to state sovereignty, when the republics declared the priority of their legislation over the union one. Union and republican laws often contradicted each other, creating a legislative dual power.*

*Declarations of their sovereignty by national republics were not extra-constitutional acts. Beginning in 1903, the Bolsheviks, in contrast to the monarchists and liberals who advocated for a unitary, “single and indivisible” Russian Empire, proclaimed in their program documents the right of nations to self-determination up to the point of secession from a single state. This clause was transferred to the USSR constitutions of 1924, 1936 and 1977, which predetermined the ease of collapse of the Union at the first attempts to create a legal state based on constitutional actions.

Centrifugal forces accelerated. The leadership of the USSR could no longer retain power through democratic means. It increasingly resorted to military force, which was used in April 1989 in Tbilisi, in January 1990 in Baku, in January 1991 in Vilnius and Riga, and finally in August 1991 in Moscow.

Under these conditions, M.S. Gorbachev proposed the first version of a new union treaty to “renew the USSR.” The discussion of this and other options, held in 1991, received (after the name of Gorbachev’s residence) the name “Novo-Ogarevo process.” He planned to grant the republics broad powers while maintaining a single state. Discussions were conducted according to priorities: “strong center - strong republics” or “strong republics - strong center”.

On March 17, 1991, the USSR (with the exception of several republics) held referendum on the fate of the USSR, at which the absolute majority of citizens spoke in favor of maintaining the union state in an updated form.

In April 1991, ten of the fifteen republics agreed to join the “renewed Union” called the “Commonwealth of Sovereign States” (CCS). Georgia participated in the negotiations, but did not sign the application to join the GCC. The signing of a new union treaty was scheduled for August 20. The draft agreement on the GCC provided for the transformation of the union state into a confederation with the elimination of many powers of the center, but with the preservation of the system of presidential power.

On August 19-21, 1991, conservative forces tried to prevent this prospect by force, maintaining real power in the hands of the union center.

On August 18, 1991, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, who was on vacation in Crimea, was blocked at his dacha in Foros. Was founded on August 19 State Committee for Emergency Situations(GKChP) of 8 people. It included Vice President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, heads of security forces - Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs B.K. Pugo, Chairman of the KGB V.A. Kryuchkov. M.S. Gorbachev was declared temporarily removed from government for health reasons. The State Emergency Committee declared its intention to restore order in the country and prevent the collapse of the USSR. A state of emergency was declared in a number of regions; administrative power was to be transferred to military leadership; the activities of opposition parties and the media were prohibited; Troops were sent to Moscow. At the same time, the State Emergency Committee announced a continuation of the course towards economic reform.

The progressive public immediately declared the unconstitutional nature of the actions of the State Emergency Committee. Free radio stations already on August 19 called the events in Moscow a putsch. Active resistance to the actions of the putschists began. The population of Moscow, Leningrad, and a number of other cities played a decisive role in it. Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of Moscow, flooded with troops, protesting against the policies of the State Emergency Committee. The opposition to the State Emergency Committee was led by Russian President B.N. Yeltsin. A number of military units went over to the side of the Russian leadership. Muscovites surrounded Yeltsin's residence in a ring of thousands - the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, the White House. Under these conditions, the State Emergency Committee did not dare to start armed actions and by August 21 was practically deprived of power. On August 22, its members were accused of attempting a coup and arrested. Real power in Moscow finally passed from the union bodies to the leadership of the RSFSR.

After the failure of the attempt to establish a state of emergency in the country, a new and final stage of the collapse of the USSR began. It was not stopped by the resumption of the “Novoogrevo process,” in which seven republics now participated. The largest republic after the RSFSR, Ukraine, refused to participate in the negotiations. Immediately after the suppression of the “August putsch,” the three Baltic republics announced their secession from the USSR. In September, the President of the USSR signed decrees recognizing this exit.

On December 8, 1991, three “Slavic republics” - the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR announced the dissolution of the USSR and the creation "Commonwealth of Independent States"(CIS). This event, which occurred in secret from the President of the USSR and the peoples of the country, went down in history as the “Belovezhskaya Agreement”. It was reached between the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin, the President of the Ukrainian SSR L.M. Kravchuk and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the BSSR S.S. Shushkevich. On December 21, eleven republics supported the “Belovezhskaya Agreement” on the creation of the CIS and the dissolution of the USSR (“Alma-Ata Agreement”).

On December 25, 1991, the President of the USSR resigned, and on the 26th, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by a decision of one chamber (the Union Council), officially recognized the dissolution of the USSR and self-liquidated.

2.4.1. The USSR was unitary federation with a strictly unified, centralized system of public administration. It included 53 national-territorial entities - union and autonomous republics, autonomous regions and districts. According to the 1979 and 1985 censuses. 101 ethnic groups were identified. The basis of this national-state unity was the CPSU. The party committees of the national republics were only its regional branches. At the same time, the bureaucratic centralism of the party system made the national elites reliable components of the unified power structure of the CPSU.

During the years of Soviet socialism, conditions were created in the USSR for the development of nations. Ethnonational groups were guaranteed territorial autonomy, the formation and operation of cultural institutions in national languages, as well as the creation of local personnel and their own national nomenclature - clans (one of the factors of the future disintegration process on the territory of the USSR).

In this situation, the national question in the USSR was considered resolved completely and finally (the victory of socialism automatically excluded the possibility of national conflicts and contradictions on the territory of the Soviet state). This was supported by the thesis about the creation of a new international community - the Soviet people.

Russians in the USSR, who made up 51.3% of the total population and occupied 3/4 of the territory of the USSR, did not enjoy any advantages over other nations and nationalities. Moreover, in the RSFSR there has never been a republican communist party and the corresponding central bodies of its government (there was no Russian Central Committee). Therefore, the sphere of direct (from the CPSU Central Committee) control extended to the Russian Federation. This led to the fact that the center of the union state was associated with the Russians, and the concept of an older and younger brother entered into the nature of the relationship between the republics.

2.4.2. Hidden causes of interethnic conflicts.

At the same time, during the years of Soviet power, ethnic minorities in a number of republics (especially Transcaucasian ones, for example, in Georgia in relation to the Mingrelian and Svan languages, in Azerbaijan Kurdish and Lezgin) were subjected to assimilation and discrimination by the titular nations. This was also the reason for future interethnic conflicts (Armenians against Azerbaijanis in Karabakh, Ossetians against Georgians, etc.). Changing the boundaries of autonomy and the discrepancy, as a rule, between ethnic settlement and political statehood led to territorial disputes between ethnic groups, which caused future conflicts between Chechnya and Dagestan, Chechnya and the Cossacks, Ingushetia and North Ossetia, etc.

The national minority (younger brother) complex, as well as Russian acculturation, came to the fore by the end of the 80s. national problems come to the fore.

2.5. Spiritual life of society in the 70s was complex and contradictory . On the one hand, pomp and dogmatism, the ideologization of science and culture, on the other, a slow but inevitable growth of protest. The thaw did not pass without a trace, and the Iron Curtain became less dense.

2.5.1. The gap between ordinary citizens and those in power became wider and wider, social stratification increased, which negatively affected the spiritual state of society. It grew in him social apathy, blossomed double standards, as above, so below.

2.5.2. If in the working environment this was manifested in absenteeism, drunkenness, and anecdotes about the country's top leadership, then among the intelligentsia, unspoken criticism of the Soviet system and discussions in private conversations about the problems of the political, social and economic situation in the country became characteristic.

The most radical, although least massive expression of disagreement and protest was dissident movement. Among its ranks were representatives of the creative intelligentsia, national minorities, and believers. By the second half of the 60s. refers to the emergence of the human rights movement, of which the academician became an active participant HELL. Sakharov. On its basis, the Human Rights Committee in the USSR was created; Moscow Helsinki Group, Christian Committee for the Rights of Believers, etc. Dissidents organized protests (in particular, in connection with the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia) and tried to organize the production of illegal literature. Then the main form of their activity became protests and appeals to the country's top leaders and law enforcement agencies (such as A.I. Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union). Despite its small numbers, dissidence posed a moral and ideological threat to the system.

As a protective measure by the authorities at the suggestion of the KGB Chairman Yu.V. Andropova The Fifth Directorate of the KGB was created specifically to combat dissidence, which used in its arsenal arrests, prosecutions, deportation abroad, and referrals for treatment to psychiatric hospitals. At first, open trials were still used (as, for example, over writers A. Sinyavsky And Y. Daniel in 1966, etc.). But in the 70s. the persecution of renegades was not advertised; their deportation abroad was increasingly practiced.

In 1985, Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, and at the end of 1991. The USSR collapsed. The collapse of the Soviet Union while Gorbachev was in power is associated with his mistakes. His mistakes manifested themselves, first of all, in the fact that he ignored or did not understand the significance of the national question in the Soviet Union. When he came to power in 1985, the Soviet Union was already a state in complete crisis. Faced with economic stagnation and a democratic deficit in the political sphere, Gorbachev came up with the idea of ​​“perestroika.” But the only thing that he did not pay attention to was the national question, since at that time he believed that everything was “safe” here. 104 And only in the 1990s. at the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU, he admitted that “we did not realize the significance of this problem” (i.e., the national question) and did not see the danger hidden in it in a timely manner.” 105

Precisely because there was no understanding of the danger of the national issue, when national problems arose, “we found ourselves completely unprepared for everything that happened.” 106 The lack of ideological preparation led to the fact that Gorbachev’s actions to resolve national problems became chaotic, vacillating from left to right.

Further, the mistakes of the political reforms carried out by Gorbachev also manifested themselves in the solution of national relations. Firstly, having proclaimed the slogans “glasnost” and “not leaving blank spots in history,” Gorbachev did not think that this could affect the most complex area of ​​long-standing historical grievances. Under these conditions, the new leadership had to pay off the debts of its predecessors: for the perversions associated with “building socialism in one country” and “discrediting genuine internationalism”; “for Stalin’s national policy,” extremely bureaucratic and repressive; for Brezhnev’s “personnel policy”, which tried to defuse the time bomb of the national question, systematically relying on bureaucratic regional mafias, and not wanting to solve a single serious problem related to relations between various republics within the Union. 107 With the beginning of democratization and the restoration of historical truth, the tension that had accumulated over a long time was discharged in rapidly growing centrifugal forces. And just after putting forward the slogans of “restoring historical truth,” the national question immediately came to the surface, for which Gorbachev was not ready. This was marked by the beginning of the active formation and movement of national fronts of the Union Republics.

The formation of informal political associations took a specific form in the non-Russian regions of the USSR. Here, all the incentives that were characteristic of such movements in Russia were complemented by indignation at the domination of foreigners - Russians. Problems of history, culture and the environment took on even more emotional overtones there than in Russia, and writers and scientists who could formulate them enjoyed greater respect there than in the metropolis. The whole logic of glasnost here led to the fact that, first of all, ethnic factors appeared on the scene. Back in the 1970s. Moscow's rule irritated intellectuals. Now glasnost allowed them to go much further and win over the entire people to their side. What was previously suppressed now powerfully came to the fore and united the efforts of people of different social backgrounds and professions. As a result, an explosive process of restructuring self-consciousness and political structures began.

Each nation had its own flashpoint, and each Republican Communist Party responded differently to this unusual development. Therefore, these requests themselves and the actions that were taken in response to them in each republic differed greatly from each other.

The most peaceful, but at the same time radical, developments were in the Baltic states. What it was about in the 1970s. only dissidents spoke, was now supported by scientists and cultural figures. Then mass public organizations and, finally, communist parties added their voices to them, albeit hesitantly and half-heartedly. The pace at which the movement developed in different republics was different: Estonia was ahead, followed by Latvia. Lithuania, which was less threatened by migration from other republics of the USSR, brought up the rear.

At first, public discontent concerned only environmental problems, but soon it became centered on what was most important for all the peoples of the Baltic states: the annexation of these countries in 1940 and the subsequent deportation of the best people. 108

In 1987-1988 the movement gained strength and began to celebrate significant dates for these peoples with demonstrations: Independence Day, 109 Deportation Day (June 14), 110 day of the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. 111 Harsh crowds wanted to publicize the truth about the events that brought them slavery.

As in Russia, the next phase was the creation of organizations with their own programs. In June 1987, the Latvian Writers' Union convened a meeting of representatives of all cultural societies of the republic. They sent radical demands to the 19th Party Conference: Latvia should become a sovereign state with Latvian as the only state language. While remaining part of the USSR, it should receive independent representation in the UN, its own military formations with command in the Latvian language, economic self-government and the right to ban immigration from other republics of the USSR. 112

Local communist parties responded to these demands quite sensibly. Realizing that such demands enjoyed the universal support of the population, the communists decided to compromise - in order to prevent an explosion and at the same time remove the most radical demands. When popular fronts were created to support creative unions (in Lithuania it was called “Sąjūdis” - “movement”), 113 the communists entered into a dialogue with it and included most of their demands in the instructions of their delegation at the 19th party conference. In October 1988, organizational congresses of popular fronts were held in all three Baltic republics. In the elections to the Supreme, republican and local councils, the popular fronts achieved complete success, winning a majority of seats in the councils of all three republics. This caused an ambivalent reaction. Firstly, the so-called “exit” movement was expanding, 114 proclaiming that the Baltic republics were never part of the USSR de jure and therefore must register all persons who were their citizens before 1940, as well as their descendants. It was these people who were supposed to elect national congresses that would restore de facto independence. Residents of the Baltic republics of other nationalities (Russians were the majority among them, but there were representatives of other nations) were alarmed. A clear hint that representatives of the indigenous people would receive all the benefits forced them to form internationalist or allied movements that advocated the preservation of the USSR and the multinational status of the USSR. In 1989 – 1990 These movements, with the support of the CPSU apparatus, organized mass demonstrations, the participants of which were mainly Russian workers of enterprises of all-Union importance. Protesting against the “creeping counter-revolution”, they paraded through the streets of Baltic cities under the sign of the hammer and sickle.

But the truly decisive events still took place in Moscow. Gorbachev's demand for more presidential powers raised fears that greater freedoms would be impossible to achieve; this prompted the Supreme Council of Lithuania, where the majority belonged to Sąjūdis and whose representative was Vytautas Landsbergis, 115 on March 11, 1990, to declare independence. The Supreme Councils of Latvia and Estonia adopted more restrained resolutions, proclaiming the beginning of a transition period, the end of which was to be the achievement of full independence.

These events made the Baltic republics the subject of polemical battles between those who wanted to preserve the Union and those who wanted to get rid of it. First, Gorbachev tried to impose his understanding of law and order on the Balts and began an economic blockade of Lithuania. 116 However, after a few months, it was stopped - now Gorbachev tried to persuade all the republics of the USSR to sign a new Union Treaty, which was supposed to replace a similar document from 1922. 117 This new treaty would grant the Union republics full self-government, but defense, foreign policy, and general economic management remained under Moscow's control. 118

In January 1991, people who had the most radical views regarding methods of protecting the then existing state structure began to act. Landing troops were sent to all three Baltic republics. Initially, the troops took control of communication systems, seizing the newspaper editorial offices and television center in Vilnius. At the same time, the anonymous “National Salvation Committees” in Lithuania and Latvia declared their readiness to take power in order to “prevent economic collapse” and the establishment of a “bourgeois dictatorship.” 119

When riot police and paratroopers approached the parliament building in Vilnius, people held hands and stopped them. At least fourteen people died. 120

Yeltsin, who was then the speaker of the Russian parliament, together with the three chairmen of the Supreme Councils of the three Baltic republics, immediately issued a statement condemning the use of armed force that threatened the sovereignty of these states. Faced with resistance, Gorbachev decided not to carry through military actions.

Another victim of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was Moldova. Creative unions were the first to show dissatisfaction here. Soon the Popular Front was created on this basis. 121 The reaction of the Communist Party here was somewhat slow, but still in the summer of 1990 Moldova was renamed the Republic of Moldova and the Declaration of Sovereignty was adopted. 122 This was seen by many as the first step towards eventual reunification with Romania. The reaction of representatives of other nationalities living in Moldova was very sharp. They proclaimed the creation of their own Transnistrian republic with its capital in the predominantly Russian city of Tiraspol on the eastern bank of the Dniester River. They did not count on help from the center and created their own formations. These units received weapons from Soviet regular troops. Transnistrian units survived after Moldova declared independence and could become a constant source of military conflict.

For centuries, the Armenian people were destroyed and expelled from their land by powerful neighbors. Therefore, the most painful issue for the residents of the republic was the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous agricultural region predominantly inhabited by Armenians. However, by decision of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, in 1921 it was annexed to Azerbaijan. 123 The insult that was inflicted on the national feelings of the Armenians was further aggravated by the fact that in a one-party system, administrative subordination affected all aspects of life. Preference was usually given to the Azerbaijani minority in everything: in the distribution of housing, in hiring, in the education system and the construction of industrial enterprises. 124 In 1988, discontent took open forms. A special committee on Karabakh was created. 125 It consisted mainly of writers, scientists and journalists, as well as, as private individuals, government officials. Branches of the Committee were created in factories, institutions and institutes, and the branches of the Committee became serious rivals of party organizations. In February, in a demonstration organized by the Karabakh Committee, demonstrators demanded that Karabakh be annexed to Armenia. The Committee also persuaded the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR to adopt several of its resolutions.

In response, the Azerbaijanis committed bloodshed in the city of Sumgait. In the summer of 1989, Moscow revoked the special status of Nagorno-Karabakh, again annexing it to Azerbaijan. In response to this, the Supreme Council of Armenia proclaimed the formation of the United Republic of Armenia, which included Nagorno-Karabakh.

The program of the Azerbaijani Popular Front was very similar to the Baltic ones, however, it specifically emphasized that the sovereignty of Azerbaijan also implies control over Nagorno-Karabakh. 126 The communist government was sharply criticized for its failure to call for a general strike of protest, which also meant an economic blockade of Karabakh and Armenia. In December, some of the Front's more radical members took power in the border town of Lankaran. They then broke down wire fences and seized checkpoints to fraternize with their compatriots across the Iranian border.

On January 13, 1990, a well-prepared congress of the Popular Front took place in Baku. 127 The first secretary of the republican party organization, Vezirov, was subjected to very sharp criticism. He was criticized for “servility to Moscow” 128 and demanded his resignation. Another demand of the congress was to hold a referendum on the issue of separation from the USSR. 129 After this, huge crowds, including many Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia, began hunting for the Armenians who were still remaining in Baku. Then Moscow introduced martial law, entered the city and, with unprecedented cruelty, restored order in it. According to official data, at least 150 people were killed in the city during these days. 130

The timing of this action suggests that its goal was not to end the ethnic conflict, but to prevent the Popular Front from coming to power. Of all the attempts to maintain communist power during perestroika, this was the bloodiest. The new communist leader of Azerbaijan, Mutalibov, took advantage of martial law to constrain the actions of the Popular Front. To win over voters, he used the old patronage system. Meanwhile, in Karabakh, each of the warring parties created their own armed formations. As Soviet and Russian power weakened, the Karabakh conflict began to take on an international character, threatening to spread not only to the entire Caucasus, but also further to the Middle East.

Georgians did not have one overarching problem like Karabakh - rather, there were many vexed issues. They were worried that the ancient monasteries of Georgia were falling into disrepair and being used for other purposes, that the Russian language was increasingly replacing Georgian in government bodies, that Russian immigration to the republic was growing, that the Aragvi valley was threatened with destruction due to the construction of the Mountain Caucasus Railway, that Baku oil refineries pollute the environment. Another cause for concern was the anti-Georgian separatism of some minorities within the republic itself, primarily the Abkhaz. The Communist Party was unable to offer a constructive program for resolving any of these problems. Therefore, public sympathies steadily shifted towards the opposite, irreconcilable end of the political spectrum in Georgia. It was occupied by the Ilya Chavchavadze Society and the National Democratic Party. The latter stated that the restoration of Georgian independence would correct a great historical injustice, and this is something “worth living, fighting and dying for.” 131 In April 1989, the National Democratic Party organized mass demonstrations in Tbilisi. Hundreds of thousands of people took part in them. Several students went on a hunger strike - and everyone demanded secession from the USSR. 132 Special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (OMON) entered the city. It is not known who gave the order, but in the early morning of April 9, troops from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs dispersed the demonstrators with batons and sharpened sapper blades, 19 people were killed, and over two hundred were mutilated. 133

In the wake of the indignation that followed these events, a post-Soviet leader came to power in Georgia, rejecting any compromises with the Communist Party and the then co-existing system - Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who led the political movement "Round Table", 134 which grew out of the Chavchavadze Society and won the parliamentary elections in October 1990 But very quickly, authoritarian methods of management led to his comrades leaving him. Gamsakhurdia arrested some opposition MPs and silenced the press. Eventually, Gamsakhurdia's opponents enlisted the support of armed militia and overthrew him.

Georgia's experience has shown that refusal to make any compromises with the existing Soviet system is fraught with instability. And the events in Central Asia, on the contrary, showed how dangerous an incomplete break with the past can be.

In Central Asia, popular front-like civil associations developed more slowly than elsewhere. This was a consequence of the predominantly rural, weakly urbanized social structure of the region, which continued to remain extremely archaic. The most influential among popular movements of this kind was Birlik (Unity), 135 created in Tashkent in May 1989. Its political program was secular and liberal, but under pressure from ordinary members the organization began to pursue more populist and Islamist policies than this was provided for by the adopted program. But in the future, the most powerful political movement in Central Asia could become the Islamic Renaissance Party, founded in Astrakhan in June 1990. 136 It had its members in all regions of the Soviet Union. Despite the non-fundamentalist and quite moderate nature of its political program, the Islamic Renaissance Party was banned almost everywhere in Central Asia.

In general, as the impending collapse of the USSR became more and more obvious, the leaders of the Central Asian republics found themselves in an increasingly difficult situation. Previously, they could count on support from Moscow; now there was almost no such support. But the pro-independence movements were too weak to produce alternative leaders. The only exception was Kyrgyzstan, where the former communist leader was extremely unpopular and therefore Askar Akayev, 137 president of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, was able to come to power. The top apparatchiks in Central Asia did not want to secede from the USSR. But the actions that they took to avoid such an outcome of events cannot be considered successful - they, so to speak, saddled the “swan”, “crayfish” and “pike”, the direction of movement of which, as is known, varies. Using the traditional clientele system to support their policies, manipulating local nationalism, they begged specialists of Slavic origin not to leave their republic. While flirting with Islam, they at the same time did not allow it to grow too strong.

In Belarus and Ukraine, the proximity of local peoples to the Russians left an imprint on the development of the national movement.

It all started when in 1987 the Writers' Union of Ukraine began a campaign against the erosion of the Ukrainian language. Soon other, no less painful issues were brought up - environmental protection (especially pressing after the Chernobyl disaster), persecution of the Uniate Church, the problem of “blank spots” in Ukrainian history and culture. 138

Until then, events developed in the same way as in the Baltic states. The next stage was to be the creation of the Popular Front. So in November 1988, an initiative group was able to gather, which included representatives of the Writers' Union and informal associations. They published the draft program of the Popular Front in a newspaper published by the Writers' Union (probably the only one that did so). The draft was very similar to similar Baltic documents - it supported perestroika, and contained a call to achieve “genuine sovereignty of Ukraine.” 139 The program also contained demands for full compliance with human rights and for granting the Ukrainian language the status of a state language on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. 140 The first congress of the front, called “Rukh,” could only take place in September 1989. 141 At the same time, the movement program was adopted. The Communist Party was still strong enough to delay its registration until the moment when nominating Rukh candidates for the 1990 elections was no longer possible. Thus, in these elections, Rukh was able to take part only as part of a democratic bloc that defended the full sovereignty of Ukraine, the transition to a market economy and freedom of religion, which implied the legalization of the Uniate Church. The democratic bloc suffered defeats in the elections in Odessa and eastern Ukraine, but achieved success in some places; having received most of the seats for which he was able to nominate candidates - about a third of the total. Democrats won a majority of seats in the city councils of Kyiv and Lviv (where the old dissident Vyacheslav Chornovil became mayor). 142 To commemorate this event, the national Ukrainian flag was raised over the Lviv Town Hall. This was accompanied by the national anthem.

The success of Rukh in the elections and the subsequent national rejoicing accelerated the processes that were taking place in the Baltic states: the establishment of friendly relations between the nationalist wing of the nomenklatura elite and the Popular Front. At the same time, the Communist Party became increasingly isolated.

As a result of all these processes, on July 16, 1990, the Supreme Council of Ukraine almost unanimously adopted a declaration of sovereignty. 143 There, not only was the primacy of Ukrainian laws over all-Union laws asserted, but all resources were declared republican property. 144 In accordance with the declaration of sovereignty, Ukraine was supposed to have: “its own armed forces, pursue an independent foreign policy and declared its permanent neutrality and non-alignment with any military blocs.”

In October 1990, on the main square of Kyiv, students supported by Rukh demanded the adoption of a new constitution for Ukraine before the Union Treaty was signed. The students won, and even forced the government to resign. Around the same time, at its second congress, Rukh declared that its goal was to proclaim the independence of Ukraine, and not the Union Treaty. Thus the path was paved for the final collapse of the Soviet Union - through the declaration of independence in August 1991, confirmed in a December referendum. 145

In Belarus, the basis of the national movement was, first of all, a community of cultural interests, and the movement initially arose as a movement of intellectuals: humanities scholars, creative intelligentsia, students of humanities universities. The intensive development of the Belarusian national movement occurred mainly in the second half of the 1980s, so in the period from 1985 to 1986. The massive creation of informal youth associations began. Despite the fact that most of them were formalized to one degree or another - registered with various public (Komsomol, creative unions) or state (cultural bodies) organizations, they had their own program and statutory documents.

A specific feature of Belarusian youth associations was their emphasized ethnicity, expressed in a keen interest in the culture and history of their republic, the use of national symbols, the consistent use of the Belarusian language in everyday communication, at club meetings, at rallies, as well as establishing contacts with similar associations in the Baltic states, in Ukraine, Moldova, Moscow.

In the spring of 1987, the movement first declared itself as an independent social force capable of having a significant impact on the development of perestroika processes. It is characteristic that the reason for decisive action was an environmental problem - the threat of flooding of the floodplain of the river. Western Dvina as a result of the construction of the Daugavpils hydroelectric station. Then, on November 1, 1987, the first informal meeting dedicated to the memory of the victims of Stalin’s repressions took place in Minsk.

Under these conditions, the tradition of holding forums of the national movement in “internal emigration” - Lithuania, which has no analogues in other regions of the country. In January 1989, the second congress of youth associations took place in Vilnius, proclaiming the creation of the Confederation of Youth Associations - an integral part of the Belarusian Popular Front. In parallel with the formation of the Belarusian Popular Front, two more public organizations were formed - “Belarusian Ecological Union” and “Belarusian Language Society named after. Skaryny." 149 In June 1989, the founding congresses of all three organizations took place in Vilnius, with the assistance of Sąjūdis. In the program adopted at the congress, national and cultural problems faded into the background, and the requirements of the sovereignty of the republic were formulated as the most important goals, i.e. establishing the priority of republican sovereignty over union sovereignty, introducing the institution of republican citizenship, transferring all natural resources to the jurisdiction of the Soviets, eliminating the constitutional consolidation of the leadership of the CPSU, equalizing the rights of all types of property, the desire to achieve a radical improvement in the environmental situation, and giving the Belarusian language the status of the state language. A significant success of the BPF on the path to reviving the Belarusian language was the adoption in January 1990 of the “Law on Languages”, which assigned the status of the state language to the Belarusian language, and the status of interethnic communication to Russian. 150

Throughout 1989, the leading place in the movement’s activities was occupied by the topic of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. As factual material was accumulated and comprehended, it became more and more obvious that the true scale of this disaster was being hushed up, and the measures being taken were insufficient and useless. The energetic actions of the Belarusian Popular Front and a number of other national organizations forced the Supreme Council of the BSSR to adopt a state program for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, including measures to organize resettlement.

The development of the national democratic movement in Belarus stimulated the revival of national self-awareness among Belarusians outside its borders: in 1988-1989. Belarusian cultural societies and communities arose in Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, Moscow and Novosibirsk.

Summing up the development of the Belarusian national democratic movement, it should be noted as its most important merit that it was it that initiated the perestroika processes in the republic. Thanks to this, the true scale of Stalin’s genocide in the republic became known to the public, an adequate assessment was given of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, after which, as a result of the initiative of informal national organizations, a republican program (the first in the USSR) was adopted to eliminate it. The ethnosocial situation in the republic that had developed by the mid-1980s was recognized as abnormal, and specific measures were outlined to radically change it. Being one of the most obvious manifestations of the national Renaissance, the Belarusian national democratic movement is its further development, contributing to the growth of national self-awareness at the mass level.

Thus, the “glasnost” proclaimed by M. S. Gorbachev, expressed in freedom of speech, rallies and processions, as well as the process of democratization, as a result of which a multi-party system was introduced, all this led to the formation of national elites in the union republics, which gave publicity to the accumulated historical problems, as well as taking power into their own hands, formed the Popular Fronts. Who sought solutions to accumulated problems and contradictions. However, the Soviet government did not study interethnic and national problems in the country, but fenced itself off from reality with ideological guidelines “about a close-knit family of fraternal peoples”, the “new historical community - the Soviet people” created in the USSR, and the next myths of “developed socialism”. 151