Why was General Pavlov shot? Western Front.
The new appointment suited Ivan Stepanovich Konev (27) quite well. Commanding the forces of the Kalinin Front was a rewarding job, and returning to command of the famous troops of the Western Front could not but cause jubilation. Konev had previously served on the Western Front and commanded it, but preferred not to remember these difficult times. However, his memories of the tragedies of the summer of 1941 were still too fresh. At that time, he commanded the famous 19th Army, transferred on the eve of the war to the North Caucasus Military District. The invincible army of two rifle and one mechanized corps was destined to become the strategic reserve of the Southwestern Front during critical periods of wartime. But in the chaos of Operation Barbarossa, Konev's once-proud army was hastily transported to the central sector and thrown piecemeal into battle west of Smolensk. Exhausted by the advancing German tank forces, the army scattered; Some of the divisions were destroyed in Smolensk, the rest, in confusion, went on the defensive east of Smolensk, where they helped to temporarily stop the indomitable German advance.
After Stalin sent Zhukov to Leningrad in September 1941, Konev took command of the Western Front, only to see his front all but collapse during the German advance on Moscow in October. After the death of two-thirds of his troops in the encircled Vyazma, Konev was given command of the remnants of the right-flank formations of the Western Front, regrouped and renamed the Kalinin Front. Konev commanded the Kalinin Front during the defense of Moscow and led it during the partially successful winter counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. In the depths of winter, Konev's troops (the majority of the army) entered into a brutal duel with counterattacking German formations under the command of General Model. Once again, Konev and Model crossed swords in August 1942, when Model was already commanding the 9th Army. Konev was looking for a new meeting with his sworn enemy, this time in the role of commander of the Western Front.
On August 26, having taken command of the Western Front from Zhukov, Konev immediately began preparing for the resumption of a life-and-death battle. Having carefully re-equipped his tank forces, he reorganized his mobile forces with a directive of September 11, turning them into a single powerful weapon capable of continuing offensive operations throughout the depth of the enemy’s defense line (28). From the battle-hardened 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps, he formed a mobile cavalry-mechanized group and placed it under the command of the experienced cavalry corps commander, Major General V.V. Kryukov. At the same time, during September and early October, Konev's front headquarters issued a stream of directives and orders in order to eliminate the mistakes that caused such damage to the front during the August operation. The most important component of these orders was the introduction of new communication procedures to make the actions of mobile groups coherent, ensuring constant communication between them and the infantry, artillery and aviation operating together (29).
Konev was proud of his combined forces. He believed that never before had such troops been so powerful and under the leadership of more experienced commanders. By October 15, they included 11 combined armies (30th, 29th, 31st, 20th, 5th, 33rd, 49th, 50th, 10th, 16th and 61st -yu), deployed along the front line from Rzhev to! north to Bryansk in the south. It was one of the strongest Soviet fronts. It included two elite guards rifle corps (5th and 8th), the armored core consisted of six tank corps (3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th), as well as the well-reequipped 3rd Tank Army of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko (30). General Kryukov's 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and the famous 1st Guards Cavalry Corps completed the list, along with an impressive arsenal of covering artillery and engineering units allocated by Stavka (see the exact order of battle of the Western Front in the Appendices).
The initial directive from Headquarters to launch Operation Mars on October 12 reached Western Front headquarters on October 1, 1942, but bad weather prevented the plan from being carried out. Therefore, the Headquarters prepared a new directive, postponing the offensive until October 28, and sent it to Konev on October 10. With difficulty containing his growing impatience, Konev shared his hopes with the officers of his headquarters and ordered them to immediately begin the complex and time-consuming process of developing a plan for a new offensive. Since Stavka had ordered detailed preparations for only the first stage of the offensive, the headquarters officers concentrated all their attention on Operation Mars, while Konev alone considered the outlines of the subsequent Operation Jupiter. From experience he knew only too well how dangerous it was to arouse great hopes in people. But he could not get rid of thoughts about Jupiter, despite the fact that Operation Mars was to begin on October 28, just a few weeks later.
Five days later, Konev's headquarters transformed the general concept of Operation Mars, developed by Headquarters, into a detailed front-line plan. Having received it from the head of the front headquarters, Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky, and after getting acquainted with him, Konev was pleased:
“The main blow was delivered by units of the 20th Army in the general direction of Gredyakino and Kateryushki. After breaking through the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, it was planned to introduce a cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough. This group, in cooperation with the armies of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, was to play a decisive role in encircling and destroying the enemy’s Rzhev-Sychev group.
To ensure success in the direction of the main attack in the breakthrough sector of the 20th Army, a superiority of forces and means over the enemy in manpower and equipment was created by almost two to three times. The outline of the front line generally favored the offensive of the armies of the left wing of the Kalinin and right wing of the Western Front, despite strong fortifications and unfavorable terrain conditions for the attacking forces.
The 20th Army delivered the main blow with its right flank with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the Vasilki, Gredyakino, Prudy front, and capturing the first and second lines of defense at the Mal line. Petrakovo, Bol. and Mal. Kropotovo, Podosinovka, Zherebtsovo. In the future, the army was supposed to leave west of the Rzhev-Sychevka railway. On the first day of the operation, it was planned to transport a cavalry-mechanized group to the western bank of the river. Vazuza.
On the second day of the operation, the 326th, 42nd, 251st, 247th rifle divisions were supposed to capture the railway line, after which the first three divisions turned the offensive front to the north-west, and the last - to the south-west. Such a maneuver of troops was supposed to provide a corridor 15–18 km wide for introducing a cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough.
The further task of the cavalry-mechanized group by the front commander was determined as follows (Diagram 24):
6th Tank Corps to deliver a concentrated attack in the direction of Sychevka and capture this settlement in cooperation with units of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps advancing from the northeast;
The 20th Cavalry Division will advance on Andreevskoye, preventing enemy reserves from approaching from the southwest, and destroy enemy units departing from Sychevka;
The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (without the 20th Cavalry Division) should attack Chertolino in order to cut the Rzhev-Olenin railway and subsequently, in cooperation with units advancing from the front, destroy the enemy’s Rzhev grouping” (31).
Konev was well aware of how much work was required to turn this smooth scenario into a detailed operational plan for the operation. Headquarters developers faced serious problems. It would be difficult to deliver powerful strikes at the same time as crossing a large river, even if, as Konev hoped, the river would freeze. In addition, after the first strike, the river was supposed to become a serious obstacle to advance and a bottleneck for transport transporting ammunition. On the right flank of the 20th Army, the Osuga River limited freedom of action and forced the offensive to be carried out in a narrow “corridor”. It also had to be crossed in order for the offensive to develop at the required speed. Drawing a demarcation line between the 20th and 31st armies along the Osuga River partially eliminated this difficulty, but the terrain was still by no means ideal for an offensive.
Konev also thought about the enemy. Although the German infantry divisions had not yet recovered from the August battles, they were already entrenched in a carefully prepared strong defensive line. When intelligence reported to Konev that the German 5th Panzer Division was still covering the front line of defense, he shuddered, remembering the damage that division had inflicted on the advancing Soviet troops in August. Moreover, other tank formations were hiding somewhere in the rear, but the scouts were unable to find out either their numbers or their exact location. Konev sincerely hoped that with the coordinated offensive of Soviet troops on all sectors of the Rzhev salient, these dangerous enemy reserves would be thrown into other places, but deep down he knew that they would be enough for his share.
Driving away terrible thoughts, Konev left the headquarters, leaving the officers to do their work.
Commanders of front troops. It was on their ability to manage large military groups that success or failure in operations, battles and engagements depended. The list includes all generals who permanently or temporarily served as front commander. 9 of the military leaders on the list died during the war.
1. Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny
Reserve (September-October 1941) North Caucasian (May-August 1942)
2. Ivan Khristoforovich (Hovhannes Khachaturovich) Bagramyan
1st Baltic (November 1943 - February 1945)
3rd Belorussian (April 19, 1945 - until the end of the war)
On June 24, 1945, I. Kh. Bagramyan led the combined regiment of the 1st Baltic Front at the Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow. 
3. Joseph Rodionovich Apanasenko
Since January 1941, Commander of the Far Eastern Front, on February 22, 1941, I. R. Apanasenko was awarded the military rank of Army General. During his command of the Far Eastern Front, he did a lot to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Far East
In June 1943, I. R. Apanasenko, after numerous requests to be sent to the active army, was appointed deputy commander of the Voronezh Front. During the battles near Belgorod on August 5, 1943, he was mortally wounded during an enemy air raid and died on the same day. 
4. Pavel Artemyevich Artemyev
Front of the Mozhaisk defense line (July 18-July 30, 1941)
Moscow Reserve Front (October 9-October 12, 1941)
Commanded the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. From October 1941 to October 1943, he was commander of the Moscow defense zone. 
5. Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov
Reserve Armies Front (July 14-July 25, 1941)
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was appointed commander of the front of the reserve armies. Since November 1941, commander of the 39th Reserve Army in Torzhok, since December - deputy commander of the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front. In July 1942, after the evacuation of the commander of the 39th Army, Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov, Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov, who refused to evacuate, took over leadership of the army and led the breakthrough from encirclement. On July 16, 1942, while escaping from encirclement near the village of Krapivna, Kalinin Region, he was wounded. Having led 10,000 soldiers out of encirclement, he died in hospital on July 22 from his wounds. 
6. Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky
3rd Belorussian (February-April 1945) 
7. Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin
Voronezh (July 14-October 24, 1942)
South-West (October 25, 1942 - March 1943)
Voronezh (March-October 20, 1943)
1st Ukrainian (October 20, 1943 - February 29, 1944)
On February 29, 1944, N.F. Vatutin, together with his escort, went in two vehicles to the location of the 60th Army to check the progress of preparations for the next operation. As G.K. Zhukov recalled, upon entering one of the villages, “the cars came under fire from a UPA sabotage group. N.F. Vatutin jumped out of the car and, together with the officers, entered into a shootout, during which he was wounded in the thigh.” The seriously wounded military leader was taken by train to a Kyiv hospital. The best doctors were summoned to Kyiv, among whom was the chief surgeon of the Red Army, N. N. Burdenko. Vatutin received a through wound to the thigh with bone fragmentation. Despite surgical intervention and the use of the latest penicillin during treatment, Vatutin developed gas gangrene. A council of doctors led by Professor Shamov proposed amputation as the only means of saving the wounded, but Vatutin refused. It was never possible to save Vatutin, and on April 15, 1944, he died in the hospital from blood poisoning 
8. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov
Leningradsky (5-mid September 1941) 
9. Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov
Leningradsky (June 1942-May 1945)
2nd Baltic (February-March 1945) 
10. Philip Ivanovich Golikov
Bryansk (April-July 1942)
Voronezh (October 1942 - March 1943) 
11. Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov
Stalingrad (July 23-August 12, 1942) 
12. Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko
Western (June 30-July 2, 1941 and July 19-29, 1941)
Bryansky (August-October 1941)
South-Eastern (August-September 1942)
Stalingrad (September-December 1942)
Yuzhny (January-February 1943)
Kalininsky (April-October 1943)
1st Baltic (October-November 1943)
2nd Baltic (April 1944 - February 1945)
4th Ukrainian (from March 1945 until the end of the war) 
13. Mikhail Grigorievich Efremov
Central (7 August - end of August 1941)
From the evening of April 13, all contact with the headquarters of the 33rd Army was lost. The army ceases to exist as a single organism, and its individual parts make their way to the east in disparate groups. On April 19, 1942, in battle, Army Commander M. G. Efremov, who fought like a real hero, was seriously wounded (receiving three wounds) and, not wanting to be captured, when the situation became critical, he called his wife, who served as his medical instructor, and shot him dead. her and yourself. Along with him, the army artillery commander, Major General P. N. Ofrosimov, and almost the entire army headquarters died. Modern researchers note a high spirit of perseverance in the army. The body of M. G. Efremov was first found by the Germans, who, having deep respect for the courageous general, buried him with military honors in the village of Slobodka on April 19, 1942. The 268th Infantry Division of the 12th Army Corps recorded on the map the place of the general’s death; the report came to the Americans after the war and is still in the NARA archive. According to the testimony of Lieutenant General Yu. A. Ryabov (veteran of the 33rd Army), the body of the army commander was brought on poles, but the German general demanded that he be transferred to a stretcher. At the funeral, he ordered the prisoners from Efremov’s army to be put in front of the German soldiers and said: “Fight for Germany the way Efremov fought for Russia.” 
14. Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
Reserve (August-September 1941)
Leningradsky (mid-September-October 1941)
Western (October 1941-August 1942)
1st Ukrainian (March-May 1944)
1st Belorussian (from November 1944 until the end of the war)
On May 8, 1945 at 22:43 (May 9 0:43 Moscow time) in Karlshorst (Berlin) Zhukov accepted the unconditional surrender of the troops of Nazi Germany from Hitler's Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.
On June 24, 1945, Marshal Zhukov took part in the Victory Parade of the Soviet Union over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, which took place in Moscow on Red Square. The parade was commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky.
Commander of the ZapOVO troops, Army General Dmitry Grigorievich PavlovBorn 23.10 (4.11). 1897 in the village. The smell is now Kostroma region. Member of the 1st World War In 1957, he was rehabilitated by a General Staff commission “for lack of evidence of a crime.” | |
Chief of Staff of ZapOVO, Major General Vladimir Efimovich KlimovskikhBorn on May 27, 1885 in Kokand. In military service since 1913. Participant of the 1st World War in the positions of: head of a team of mounted reconnaissance officers, company commander, battalion commander. In the Red Army since 1918 In the Civil War he participated as an assistant chief of staff of the army, chief of staff of a division, head of a department of army staff, head of a division, group of troops. After the Civil War, he was chief of staff of a rifle corps, head of a department, and assistant chief of staff of military districts. From December 1932 to June 1936 was teaching at the Frunze Military Academy. Since July 1936 - Assistant Army Inspector, since February 1938. - Senior Lecturer at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since September 1939 was deputy chief of staff from July 1940. - Chief of Staff of the Belarusian Special Military District. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - chief of staff of the Western Front. Major General (1940). Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Honorary Weapon. |
Deputy Commander of the ZapOVO troops - Lieutenant General Ivan Vasilievich Boldin
Member of the Military Council of the ZapOVO - corps commissar A.Ya. Fominykh.
Chief of Artillery - Lieutenant General N.A. Klich
Head of the Signal Corps - Major General Grigoriev A.T.
According to "Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZAPOVO troops" N503859/cc/s [no later than May 20, 1941]:
Border with PribOVO - Oshmeny, Druskeniki, Margerabovo, Letzen, all points except Margerabov for ZapOVO inclusive.
Border with KOVO - Pinsk, Wlodawa, Demblin, all with the exception of Demblin for ZAPOVO inclusive.
Cover area N1 - 3rd army
Compound:
3rd Army Directorate;
control 4
body page;
56, 27, 85
And 24
division lines;
control 11
mechanized corps
29
And 33
tank divisions;
204
motorized division;
6
anti-tank artillery brigade;
11
border parts.
Army Headquarters - Grodno
Task- strong defense of the Grodno fortified area and field fortifications on the Kanchiamietis front, before Shchuchin claim. cover the Lida, Grodno and Bialystok directions.
Cover area N2 - 10th army
Compound:
10th Army Directorate;
control 1
And 5th Rifle Corps
8, 13, 86
And 2
division page;
control 6 cavalry corps
6
And 36
kaval divisions;
control 6 mech cases
4
And 7
tank divisions
29
motorized division;
9
mixed aviation division;
border parts.
Army headquarters - Bialystok.
Have the 6th cavalry corps in the Tykocin, Sokoly, Menlyanin area.
Border left- claim. Slozhim., Svisloch, Surals, Chileevo and further along the Bug river
Task- strong defense of the Osowiec and Zambrowski fortified areas and field fortifications within the borders, covering the direction to Bialystok and especially from Johannisburg, Ostroleka and Ostrow Mazowiecki.
Cover area N3 - 13th Army
Compound:
control 2 pages case
113
And 49
division page;
control 13 mech hulls
25
And 31
tank divisions;
208
motorized division;
border parts.
Army Headquarters Belsk
Border left- lawsuit Kossovo, Hainuvka, Drohochin, Gura Kalwaria.
Task- with the defense of field fortifications, firmly cover from Kossy and Sokolow the direction to Bielsk.
Cover area N4 - 4th army
Compound:
4th Army Directorate;
control 28 pages
6, 42, 75
And 100
division lines;
control 14 mechanized corps
22
And 30
tank division
205
motorized division;
garrison of the Brest fortified area;
10
mixed aviation division;
border parts.
Border left-border of the village of Kovo.
Task- strong defense of the Brest fortified area and field fortifications along the eastern bank of the Bug River, to cover the concentration and deployment of the army.
The district command has at its immediate disposal:
21
17
rifle division and 50
page division
47
rifle corps, consisting of 55
rifle division, 121
And 155
page divisions
44
rifle corps, consisting of 108
page division , 64
page division and 161
division lines, 37
And 143
page divisions
Anti-tank brigades - 7
-I am in the area of Blasostovitsa, Grudsk, Yaluvka; 8
-I - in the Lida area
Mechanized corps:
17 microns, composed of 27
And 36
tank divisions and 209
motorized division in the Volkovysk area
20 microns- included 26
And 38
tank divisions and 210
motorized division in the Oshmyany area.
4
airborne corps in the area of Pukhovichi, Osipovichi.
Aviation - 59
And 60
ist.aviation division; 12
And 13
bomber divisions.
3
aviation corps - composed of 42
And 52
long-range bomber air divisions and 61
fighter division. The corps is used on assignments from the High Command.
_____________________________________________________
In the 13th and 11th MK, according to Pavlov, one division each was trained, and the rest, having received recruits, had only a training unit, and even then not everywhere. The 14th MK had only one poorly trained motorized division and rifle regiments of tank divisions.
(Institute of Military History of the Russian Defense Ministry: Documents and materials; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. M. 1992; Müller-Gillerband B. German Land Army, 1933-1945; TsAMO. F. 208. Op. 25899. D. 93. L .5 (number of front with the Pinsk flotilla)| Strengths and means | Western Front (only working equipment is taken into account) | Army Group “Center” (without 3 Tgr) | Ratio |
| Personnel, thousand people | 678 | 629,9 | 1,1: 1 |
| Guns and mortars (without 50 mm), pcs. | 10296 | 12500 | 1:1,2 |
| Tanks | 2189 (2201 if added according to MK) | 810 | 2,7: 1 |
| Combat aircraft | 1539 | 1677 | 1: 1,1 |
In the first echelon, the Germans concentrated 28 divisions, of which 4 were tank divisions.
In the first echelon of the covering armies it was planned to have only 13 rifle divisions (WWII, M, 1998).
And here is the data published in “Classified as Classified”:
The number of troops at the beginning of the Belarusian defensive operation was 625,000 people + 2,300 (Pinsk military flotilla)
(Difference by 50,700 people.)
During the fighting, 45 additional divisions were added to the Soviet forces. The duration of the operation is 18 days. The width of the combat front is 450-800 km. The depth of withdrawal of Soviet troops is 450-600 km. Average daily losses are 23,210 people.
Certificate of deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West
June 13, 1941
...
Western Front
I Ground Forces
44 divisions, including SD-24, TD-12, MD-6, KD-2
II Air Force
21st air regiment
3A: 8 divisions, of which: SD - 5, TD - 2, MD - 1
10A: sd - 5 ( where did the cavalry divisions, the 6th MK and the 29th motor division go?)
13A: 11 divisions, of which: sd -6, td - 2, md - 1, cd - 2
4A: 12 divisions, of which: SD - 6, TD - 4, MD - 2
front reserve - 8 divisions, of which: SD - 2, TD - 4, MD - 2
____________________________________________________________________
From the certificate “on the conduct of training for assigned personnel in rifle divisions in 1941”:
ZAPOVO:
64 sd
108 sd- (beginning of training camps - June 1) 6000 people
143 sd- (beginning of training camps - June 1) 6000 people
161 sd- (beginning of training camps - June 1) 6000 people
_____________________________________________________________________
From the certificate it turns out that the 44th Reserve Corps was replenished. None of the 1st echelon divisions were replenished.
Approximately, the number of ZapOVO divisions was 9327 people per hp. (History of the 2nd World War, 12 volumes) with a staff strength of 14,483 people.
_____________________________________________
Directive of the NPO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZapOVO troops [no later than June 22, 1941]
1. To increase the combat readiness of troops in the districts, bring all deep rifle divisions and rifle corps directorates with corps units to the camp in the areas provided for them by the cover plan (NCO directive N503859/cc/ov/).
2. Leave the border divisions in place, having their withdrawal to the border in their assigned areas, if necessary, this will be done by my special order.
3. 44th corps, as part of the corps control 108, 64, 161 and 143rd divisions and corps units - withdraw to the Baranovichi region, at your discretion.
Move the 37th infantry division to the Lida area, incorporating it into the 21st infantry corps.
4. The withdrawal of these troops should be completed by July 1, 1941.
5. Submit a withdrawal plan indicating the order and timing of withdrawal for each connection by courier... [June 41]
People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko
Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov
_______________________________________________
So, the real location of our units on June 22, 1941. The data is compiled from orders and memories of military leaders. The most detailed location of parts 4A is indicated in Sandalovo’s book “The First Days of the War.”
3rd army
Army headquarters in Grodno.
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 4th rifle corps | |||
| 56 rifle division | major general Sakhnov S.P. | Augustow Canal area 213th Infantry Regiment in the Sapotskin area (took part in the construction of the Grodno UR) |
|
| 27 rifle division | |||
| 85 rifle division | west of Grodno | ||
| 24 rifle division | Galitsky K.N. | ||
| 11 mechanized corps (237 tanks including 31 KV and T-34) | general Mostovenko D.K. | Volkovysk | |
| 29 tank division | Steklov | Grodno district | |
| 204 motorized division | Volkovysk | Volkovysk |
6
anti-tank artillery brigade - Mikhalovo area;
garrison of the Grodno fortified area;
11
mixed aviation division;
86
border detachment.
124
GAP RGK
10th army
Commander Major General Golubev Konstantin Dmitrievich,
Chief of Staff - Major General Pyotr Ivanovich Lyapin.
Army headquarters - Bialystok.
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 5 rifle corps | major general Garnov A.V. | Zambrow | |
| 86 rifle division | Tsekhanovets | Ciechanowiec district | |
| 13 rifle division | Snyadovo | Śniadowo-Zambrów district | |
| 6 cavalry corps | Nikitin I.S. | Lomza | Lomza district |
| 6 cavalry division | Lomza | Lomza | |
| 36 cavalry division | Volkovysk | Volkovysk | |
| 6 mechanized building (1021 tanks including 14 KV and 338 T-34) | major general Khatskilevich Mikhail Georgievich | Bialystok | |
| 4 tank division | Bialystok | Bialystok area | |
| 7th Panzer Division | major general Borzilov | Bialystok area | Bialystok area |
| 29 motorized division | Bialystok | Bialystok area |
garrisons of the Osovetsky and Zambrovo fortified areas;
9
mixed aviation division - Bialystok area;
border parts.
4th army
Commander - Major General Korobkov A.A.
Chief of Staff - Colonel Sandalov Leonid Mikhailovich
Army Headquarters - Kobrin
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 28th Rifle Corps | major general Popov Vasily Stepanovich | Brest | |
| 6 rifle division | Popsuy-Shapko M.A. | Brest | Brest |
| 42 rifle division | major general Lazarenko I.S. | Brest | Brest, Zhabinka |
| 75 rifle division | general Nedvigin S.I. | Malorita | Mednaya district, Chersk, Malorita |
| 14th mechanized corps (520 tanks) | general Oborin S.I., chief of staff - Colonel Tutarinov I.V. | Kobrin | |
| 22 tank division | general Puganov V.P. | Brest | Brest |
| 30 tank division (174 T-26 tanks) | Colonel Bogdanov S.I., chief of staff - colonel Bolotov N.N. | Pruzhany | Pruzhany |
| 205 motorized division | Colonel Kudyurov F.F. | Bereza-Kartuzskaya | Bereza-Kartuzskaya |
The 49th Division was transferred to 4A from 13A.
10
mixed aviation division (commander - Colonel Belov M.G.)
(of the new types of aircraft: Yak-1 - 20, Il-2 - 8, Pe-2 - 5)
33rd (Pruzhany) and 123rd (Kobrin) fighter regiments,
74th Assault Aviation Regiment - field airfield southeast of Vysokoye
39th Bomber Regiment (Pinsk);
30
mixed air division (241 aircraft):
138 fighters (I-16 - 44, I-153 - 74 and Yak-1 - 20 aircraft)
55 attack aircraft (I-15 - 47 and IL-2 - 8 aircraft)
48 bombers (SB - 43 and Pe-2 - 5 aircraft)
Kobrin air defense brigade district:
218th and 298th air defense divisions of the RGK,
28th separate anti-aircraft artillery battery,
11th VNOS Battalion
(anti-aircraft units of the brigade area, as well as anti-aircraft divisions of the 4th Army formations, were located in the Krupki district camp, 115 km northeast of Minsk, 450 km from the border (!?))
Brest UR:
16th, 17th, 18th machine gun and artillery battalions
Brest border detachment(commander - Kuznetsov A.P.)
120 gap RGK - Kossovo
As Sandalov writes, “the troops of the 4th Army did not have an operational formation, however, the actual location of its formations by June 22, 1941 can be imagined as a formation in two echelons: the first echelon - four rifle and one tank divisions; the second echelon - one tank and one motorized division."
* * *13th Army
Commander Lieutenant General Filatov Petr Mikhailovich
Chief of Staff - Brigade Commander A.V. Petrushevsky
On June 22, the Army Headquarters was in Mogilev due to which,
113 SD and 13 MK were transferred to 10A,
49 SD was transferred to 4A
2nd Rifle Corps
(commander - Major General Ermakov A.N.) - in Minsk
100
Major General Russiyanov I.N.) - in Minsk
161
rifle division (commander - Colonel Mikhailov A.I.)
21
rifle corps(commander - Major General Borisov V.B.) in the area of Druskeniki, Yasidomlya, Skidel, Dembrovo
17
rifle division (commander - Major General Batsanov T.K.)
50
rifle division (commander - Major General Evdokimov V.P.)
37
rifle division (commander - Colonel Chekharin A.E.) - Lida district
47
rifle corps(commander - General Povetkin S.I.) - in Bobruisk
in the area of Pruzhany, Zaprudy, Kartuzbereza, Bluden
55
rifle division (commander - Colonel Ivanov D.I.) - Slutsk
121
rifle division (commander - Major General Zykov P.M.)
143
rifle division (commander - Major General Safonov D.P.)
44
rifle corps(commander - major general Yushkevich V.A.) - Baranovichi district
108
rifle division (commander - Major General Mavrichev A.I.) - district of Minsk
64
rifle division (commander - Colonel Iovlev S.I.) - district of Minsk
8
anti-tank artillery brigade (commander - Strelbitsky I.S.) - in the Lida region
7
anti-tank artillery brigade in the area of the village of Blasostowica, Grudsk, Yaluvka
17
mechanized corps(36 tanks, commander - General Petrov) - Baranovichi district
27
tank division - in Novogrudok
36
tank division - Nesvizh region
209
motorized division - in Ivye
20
mechanized corps(93 tanks) - Borisov district
26
tank division - in Minsk
38
tank division - Borisov
210
motorized division - Osipovichi
12
13
bomber division
3rd aviation corps (commander - Colonel Skripko N.S.)
4th airborne corps (commander - General Zhadov A.S.) - Pukhovichi district
Pinsk flotilla(commander - Admiral Rogachev D.D.)
Western Front Air Force
A total of 16 airfields for the base of 9, 10 and 11 gardens
Tirnovo (12 km from the border) - 131 aircraft (66 Mig-3 and 65 I-153)
Dolubovo (22 km from the border) - 83 aircraft (50 Mig-3 and 33 I-16)
Wysokie Mazowiec (16 km from the border) - 101 aircraft (70 Mig-3 and 31 I-16)
All aircraft on the ground at these airfields were destroyed.
In total, 732 aircraft were destroyed on the Western Front on the first day of the war.
| Aviation formations (mixed and bomber) | Enemy aircraft shot down | Shot down in air battles | Shot down by anti-aircraft artillery | Destroyed on earth | Didn't return from mission |
| 9 garden | 74 | 74 | - | 278 | - |
| 10 garden | 23 | 23 | - | 157 | - |
| 11 garden | 34 | 34 | - | 93 | - |
| 12 bad | - | 2 | - | - | |
| 13 bad | - | 15 | - | 46 | |
| 3rd Air Corps | 2 | 1 | - | 7 | |
| Total: | 133 | 18 | 528 | 53 |
Aviation of the Western Front |
||||||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|
| 9th garden | Bialystok (administration hell) | MiG-3, I-16 | 2/0 | 5/2 | 5 | - | - | - | - | |
| 41 IAP | Bialystok, Seburcin | MiG-3, MiG-1 | 56/14 | 27/27 | 27 | - | - | - | 16 | |
| I-16, I-15 | 22/4 | 36/18 | 36 | 25 | 25 | - | - | |||
| 124 iap | Bialystok | MiG-3 | 70/8 | 16/16 | 16 | - | - | - | 29 | |
| M.Mezowiecki | I-16 | 29/2 | 24/24 | 24 | - | - | - | - | ||
| 126 iap | Belsk, Dolubovo | MiG-3 | 50/12 | 21/21 | 21 | 4 | 4 | - | 31 | |
| I-16 | 23/10 | 42/13 | 42 | - | - | - | - | |||
| 129 iap | Zabludovo, Tarnovo village | MiG-3 | 61/5 | - | - | - | - | 34 | ||
| I-153 | 57/8 | 40/40 | 40 | 11 | 11 | - | - | |||
| 13 bap | Ros, Borisovshizna | SB, Ar-2 | 51/11 | 45/40 | 45 | 15 | 5 | - | - | |
| Pe-2 | 8/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| Total in the air division | MiG-3, MiG-1, I-16, I-15, I-153, SB, Pe-2, Ar-2 | 429/74 | 256/201 | 256 | 55 | 45 | 0 | 110 | ||
| 10th garden | Kobrin (control hell) | SB | 1/0 | 3/1 | - | - | - | - | - | |
| 33 IAP | Pruzhany | I-16 | 44/7 | 70/37 | 70 | 29 | 29 | - | - | |
| 74 hat | Pruzhany | I-153, I-15bis | 62/2 | 70/60 | 70 | 21 | 21 | - | - | |
| IL-2 | 8/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| 123 iap | Strigovo, Name Day | I-153 | 61/8 | 71/53 | 71 | 6 | 6 | - | - | |
| Yak-1 | 20/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| 39 bap | Pinsk, Zhabitsy | SB | 43/2 | 49/39 | 49 | 18 | 18 | - | - | |
| Pe-2 | 9/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, Yak-1, I-16, I-15, I-153 | 248/19 | 263/190 | 260 | 74 | 74 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 11th garden | Lida (control hell) | SB, I-16, I-153 | 4/0 | 8/4 | 8 | - | - | - | - | |
| 122 iap | Lida | I-16, I-15bis | 71/11 | 50/50 | 50 | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
| 127 iap | Skidel, Lesishche | I-153, I-15 | 72/7 | 53/53 | 53 | 39 | 21 | - | - | |
| 16 bap | Stomach, Cherlena | SB | 24/1 | 46/23 | 46 | 17 | 17 | 17 | - | |
| Pe-2 | 37/0 | - | - | - | - | 39 | ||||
| Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, I-16, I-15bis, I-153 | 208/19 | 157/130 | 157 | 61 | 43 | 17 | 39 | ||
| 12th bad | Vitebsk (administration hell) | SB | 1/0 | 4/1 | 4 | - | - | - | - | |
| 43 bap | Vitebsk | Su-2 | 46/1 | 71/33 | 33 | 26 | 26 | - | 38 | |
| 128 bap | Ulla | SB | 41/1 | 68/31 | 31 | - | - | - | 37 | |
| 6 bap | Vitebsk | SB | 18/2 | 54/16 | 25 | - | - | - | 29 | |
| 209 bap | Balbasovo, Betskoye | Su-2 | 25/1 | 3/3 | 3 | - | - | - | ||
| 215 bap | Smolensk, Travniki | I-15bis | 15/1 | 10/10 | 10 | - | - | - | ||
| Total in the air division | SB, Su-2, I-15bis | 146/6 | 210/94 | 106 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 104 | ||
| 13th bad | Bobruisk (administration hell) | SB | 1/0 | 3/1 | 3 | - | - | - | - | |
| 24 bap | Bobruisk, Teikichi, Telushe | SB | 41/6 | 49/35 | 49 | 27 | 19 | - | - | |
| 97 bap | Bobruisk | Su-2 | 51/26 | 49/25 | 25 | - | - | - | 24 | |
| 121 bap | Bykhov | SB | 56/9 | 51/39 | 39 | - | - | - | 12 | |
| 125 bap | Bykhov | SB | 38/6 | 55/32 | 43 | 11 | 11 | - | 12 | |
| 130 bap | Bobrovichi, Gnoevo | SB | 38/8 | 51/30 | 51 | 12 | 12 | - | - | |
| Total in the air division | SB, Su-2 | 225/55 | 258/162 | 210 | 50 | 42 | 0 | 48 | ||
| 43rd IAD | Balbasovo (administration hell) | I-16 | 2/0 | 4/2 | 4 | - | - | - | - | |
| 160 iap | Balbasovo, Prongeevka | I-153, I-15 | 66/5 | 75/39 | 39 | - | - | - | 36 | |
| 161 iap | Balbasovo, Zubovo | I-16 | 62/3 | 59/17 | 17 | - | - | - | 42 | |
| 162 iap | Mogilev, Yedlino | I-16 | 54/4 | 95/13 | 13 | - | - | - | 82 | |
| 163 IAP | Mogilev, Lubnice | I-16 | 59/3 | 82/10 | 10 | - | - | - | 72 | |
| Total in the air division | I-16, I-153, I-15 | 243/15 | 315/81 | 83 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 232 | ||
| 313th rap | Horsefly | SB | 20/1 | 67/20 | 38 | 12 | 5 | - | 29 | |
| 314th rap | Baranovichi | SB | 5/0 | 35/5 | 35 | - | - | - | - | |
| Yak-2, Yak-4 | 28/0 | - | - | - | - | 12 | ||||
| 161st reserve up | Lepel | I-16, I-153, I-15 | 42/8 | 65/34 | 65 | 7 | 7 | - | - | |
| 162nd reserve up | Zyabrovka, Bronnoe, Kholmich | I-16, I-153, SB | 64/8 | 76/56 | 76 | - | - | - | - | |
| Total per department up | SB, Yak-2, Yak-4, I-16, I-153, I-15 | 159/17 | 243/115 | 214 | 19 | 12 | 0 | 41 | ||
| Total for the Air Force of the military district | 1658/205 | 1702/973 | 1286 | 285 | 242 | 17 | 574 | |||
| Including new types | MiG-3, MiG-1, Yak-1, Pe-2, Il-2, Yak-2, Yak-4 | 347/39 | 64/64 | 64 | 4 | 4 | 16 1 | |||
2 - Name of deployment points
3 - Aircraft types
4 - Number of combat aircraft (denominator - including faulty aircraft)
5 - Total number of crews (denominator - including the number of combat-ready crews capable of simultaneously taking to the air to carry out a combat mission, depending on the availability of serviceable combat aircraft and combat-ready crews in the aviation regiments)
6-10 - Crews prepared for combat operations:
6 - during the day in normal weather conditions
7 - at night in normal weather conditions
8 - during the day in difficult weather conditions
9 - at night in difficult weather conditions
10 - retrained or commissioned upon arrival from colleges
Commander of the ZapOVO troops, Army General Dmitry Grigorievich PavlovBorn 23.10 (4.11). 1897 in the village. The smell is now Kostroma region. Member of the 1st World War In 1957, he was rehabilitated by a General Staff commission “for lack of evidence of a crime.” | |
Chief of Staff of ZapOVO, Major General Vladimir Efimovich KlimovskikhBorn on May 27, 1885 in Kokand. In military service since 1913. Participant of the 1st World War in the positions of: head of a team of mounted reconnaissance officers, company commander, battalion commander. In the Red Army since 1918 In the Civil War he participated as an assistant chief of staff of the army, chief of staff of a division, head of a department of army staff, head of a division, group of troops. After the Civil War, he was chief of staff of a rifle corps, head of a department, and assistant chief of staff of military districts. From December 1932 to June 1936 was teaching at the Frunze Military Academy. Since July 1936 - Assistant Army Inspector, since February 1938. - Senior Lecturer at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since September 1939 was deputy chief of staff from July 1940. - Chief of Staff of the Belarusian Special Military District. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - chief of staff of the Western Front. Major General (1940). Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Honorary Weapon. |
Deputy Commander of the ZapOVO troops - Lieutenant General Ivan Vasilievich Boldin
Member of the Military Council of the ZapOVO - corps commissar A.Ya. Fominykh.
Chief of Artillery - Lieutenant General N.A. Klich
Head of the Signal Corps - Major General Grigoriev A.T.
According to "Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZAPOVO troops" N503859/cc/s [no later than May 20, 1941]:
Border with PribOVO - Oshmeny, Druskeniki, Margerabovo, Letzen, all points except Margerabov for ZapOVO inclusive.
Border with KOVO - Pinsk, Wlodawa, Demblin, all with the exception of Demblin for ZAPOVO inclusive.
Cover area N1 - 3rd army
Compound:
3rd Army Directorate;
control 4
body page;
56, 27, 85
And 24
division lines;
control 11
mechanized corps
29
And 33
tank divisions;
204
motorized division;
6
anti-tank artillery brigade;
11
border parts.
Army Headquarters - Grodno
Task- strong defense of the Grodno fortified area and field fortifications on the Kanchiamietis front, before Shchuchin claim. cover the Lida, Grodno and Bialystok directions.
Cover area N2 - 10th army
Compound:
10th Army Directorate;
control 1
And 5th Rifle Corps
8, 13, 86
And 2
division page;
control 6 cavalry corps
6
And 36
kaval divisions;
control 6 mech cases
4
And 7
tank divisions
29
motorized division;
9
mixed aviation division;
border parts.
Army headquarters - Bialystok.
Have the 6th cavalry corps in the Tykocin, Sokoly, Menlyanin area.
Border left- claim. Slozhim., Svisloch, Surals, Chileevo and further along the Bug river
Task- strong defense of the Osowiec and Zambrowski fortified areas and field fortifications within the borders, covering the direction to Bialystok and especially from Johannisburg, Ostroleka and Ostrow Mazowiecki.
Cover area N3 - 13th Army
Compound:
control 2 pages case
113
And 49
division page;
control 13 mech hulls
25
And 31
tank divisions;
208
motorized division;
border parts.
Army Headquarters Belsk
Border left- lawsuit Kossovo, Hainuvka, Drohochin, Gura Kalwaria.
Task- with the defense of field fortifications, firmly cover from Kossy and Sokolow the direction to Bielsk.
Cover area N4 - 4th army
Compound:
4th Army Directorate;
control 28 pages
6, 42, 75
And 100
division lines;
control 14 mechanized corps
22
And 30
tank division
205
motorized division;
garrison of the Brest fortified area;
10
mixed aviation division;
border parts.
Border left-border of the village of Kovo.
Task- strong defense of the Brest fortified area and field fortifications along the eastern bank of the Bug River, to cover the concentration and deployment of the army.
The district command has at its immediate disposal:
21
17
rifle division and 50
page division
47
rifle corps, consisting of 55
rifle division, 121
And 155
page divisions
44
rifle corps, consisting of 108
page division , 64
page division and 161
division lines, 37
And 143
page divisions
Anti-tank brigades - 7
-I am in the area of Blasostovitsa, Grudsk, Yaluvka; 8
-I - in the Lida area
Mechanized corps:
17 microns, composed of 27
And 36
tank divisions and 209
motorized division in the Volkovysk area
20 microns- included 26
And 38
tank divisions and 210
motorized division in the Oshmyany area.
4
airborne corps in the area of Pukhovichi, Osipovichi.
Aviation - 59
And 60
ist.aviation division; 12
And 13
bomber divisions.
3
aviation corps - composed of 42
And 52
long-range bomber air divisions and 61
fighter division. The corps is used on assignments from the High Command.
_____________________________________________________
In the 13th and 11th MK, according to Pavlov, one division each was trained, and the rest, having received recruits, had only a training unit, and even then not everywhere. The 14th MK had only one poorly trained motorized division and rifle regiments of tank divisions.
(Institute of Military History of the Russian Defense Ministry: Documents and materials; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. M. 1992; Müller-Gillerband B. German Land Army, 1933-1945; TsAMO. F. 208. Op. 25899. D. 93. L .5 (number of front with the Pinsk flotilla)| Strengths and means | Western Front (only working equipment is taken into account) | Army Group “Center” (without 3 Tgr) | Ratio |
| Personnel, thousand people | 678 | 629,9 | 1,1: 1 |
| Guns and mortars (without 50 mm), pcs. | 10296 | 12500 | 1:1,2 |
| Tanks | 2189 (2201 if added according to MK) | 810 | 2,7: 1 |
| Combat aircraft | 1539 | 1677 | 1: 1,1 |
In the first echelon, the Germans concentrated 28 divisions, of which 4 were tank divisions.
In the first echelon of the covering armies it was planned to have only 13 rifle divisions (WWII, M, 1998).
And here is the data published in “Classified as Classified”:
The number of troops at the beginning of the Belarusian defensive operation was 625,000 people + 2,300 (Pinsk military flotilla)
(Difference by 50,700 people.)
During the fighting, 45 additional divisions were added to the Soviet forces. The duration of the operation is 18 days. The width of the combat front is 450-800 km. The depth of withdrawal of Soviet troops is 450-600 km. Average daily losses are 23,210 people.
Certificate of deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West
June 13, 1941
...
Western Front
I Ground Forces
44 divisions, including SD-24, TD-12, MD-6, KD-2
II Air Force
21st air regiment
3A: 8 divisions, of which: SD - 5, TD - 2, MD - 1
10A: sd - 5 ( where did the cavalry divisions, the 6th MK and the 29th motor division go?)
13A: 11 divisions, of which: sd -6, td - 2, md - 1, cd - 2
4A: 12 divisions, of which: SD - 6, TD - 4, MD - 2
front reserve - 8 divisions, of which: SD - 2, TD - 4, MD - 2
____________________________________________________________________
From the certificate “on the conduct of training for assigned personnel in rifle divisions in 1941”:
ZAPOVO:
64 sd
108 sd- (beginning of training camps - June 1) 6000 people
143 sd- (beginning of training camps - June 1) 6000 people
161 sd- (beginning of training camps - June 1) 6000 people
_____________________________________________________________________
From the certificate it turns out that the 44th Reserve Corps was replenished. None of the 1st echelon divisions were replenished.
Approximately, the number of ZapOVO divisions was 9327 people per hp. (History of the 2nd World War, 12 volumes) with a staff strength of 14,483 people.
_____________________________________________
Directive of the NPO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZapOVO troops [no later than June 22, 1941]
1. To increase the combat readiness of troops in the districts, bring all deep rifle divisions and rifle corps directorates with corps units to the camp in the areas provided for them by the cover plan (NCO directive N503859/cc/ov/).
2. Leave the border divisions in place, having their withdrawal to the border in their assigned areas, if necessary, this will be done by my special order.
3. 44th corps, as part of the corps control 108, 64, 161 and 143rd divisions and corps units - withdraw to the Baranovichi region, at your discretion.
Move the 37th infantry division to the Lida area, incorporating it into the 21st infantry corps.
4. The withdrawal of these troops should be completed by July 1, 1941.
5. Submit a withdrawal plan indicating the order and timing of withdrawal for each connection by courier... [June 41]
People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko
Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov
_______________________________________________
So, the real location of our units on June 22, 1941. The data is compiled from orders and memories of military leaders. The most detailed location of parts 4A is indicated in Sandalovo’s book “The First Days of the War.”
3rd army
Army headquarters in Grodno.
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 4th rifle corps | |||
| 56 rifle division | major general Sakhnov S.P. | Augustow Canal area 213th Infantry Regiment in the Sapotskin area (took part in the construction of the Grodno UR) |
|
| 27 rifle division | |||
| 85 rifle division | west of Grodno | ||
| 24 rifle division | Galitsky K.N. | ||
| 11 mechanized corps (237 tanks including 31 KV and T-34) | general Mostovenko D.K. | Volkovysk | |
| 29 tank division | Steklov | Grodno district | |
| 204 motorized division | Volkovysk | Volkovysk |
6
anti-tank artillery brigade - Mikhalovo area;
garrison of the Grodno fortified area;
11
mixed aviation division;
86
border detachment.
124
GAP RGK
10th army
Commander Major General Golubev Konstantin Dmitrievich,
Chief of Staff - Major General Pyotr Ivanovich Lyapin.
Army headquarters - Bialystok.
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 5 rifle corps | major general Garnov A.V. | Zambrow | |
| 86 rifle division | Tsekhanovets | Ciechanowiec district | |
| 13 rifle division | Snyadovo | Śniadowo-Zambrów district | |
| 6 cavalry corps | Nikitin I.S. | Lomza | Lomza district |
| 6 cavalry division | Lomza | Lomza | |
| 36 cavalry division | Volkovysk | Volkovysk | |
| 6 mechanized building (1021 tanks including 14 KV and 338 T-34) | major general Khatskilevich Mikhail Georgievich | Bialystok | |
| 4 tank division | Bialystok | Bialystok area | |
| 7th Panzer Division | major general Borzilov | Bialystok area | Bialystok area |
| 29 motorized division | Bialystok | Bialystok area |
garrisons of the Osovetsky and Zambrovo fortified areas;
9
mixed aviation division - Bialystok area;
border parts.
4th army
Commander - Major General Korobkov A.A.
Chief of Staff - Colonel Sandalov Leonid Mikhailovich
Army Headquarters - Kobrin
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 28th Rifle Corps | major general Popov Vasily Stepanovich | Brest | |
| 6 rifle division | Popsuy-Shapko M.A. | Brest | Brest |
| 42 rifle division | major general Lazarenko I.S. | Brest | Brest, Zhabinka |
| 75 rifle division | general Nedvigin S.I. | Malorita | Mednaya district, Chersk, Malorita |
| 14th mechanized corps (520 tanks) | general Oborin S.I., chief of staff - Colonel Tutarinov I.V. | Kobrin | |
| 22 tank division | general Puganov V.P. | Brest | Brest |
| 30 tank division (174 T-26 tanks) | Colonel Bogdanov S.I., chief of staff - colonel Bolotov N.N. | Pruzhany | Pruzhany |
| 205 motorized division | Colonel Kudyurov F.F. | Bereza-Kartuzskaya | Bereza-Kartuzskaya |
The 49th Division was transferred to 4A from 13A.
10
mixed aviation division (commander - Colonel Belov M.G.)
(of the new types of aircraft: Yak-1 - 20, Il-2 - 8, Pe-2 - 5)
33rd (Pruzhany) and 123rd (Kobrin) fighter regiments,
74th Assault Aviation Regiment - field airfield southeast of Vysokoye
39th Bomber Regiment (Pinsk);
30
mixed air division (241 aircraft):
138 fighters (I-16 - 44, I-153 - 74 and Yak-1 - 20 aircraft)
55 attack aircraft (I-15 - 47 and IL-2 - 8 aircraft)
48 bombers (SB - 43 and Pe-2 - 5 aircraft)
Kobrin air defense brigade district:
218th and 298th air defense divisions of the RGK,
28th separate anti-aircraft artillery battery,
11th VNOS Battalion
(anti-aircraft units of the brigade area, as well as anti-aircraft divisions of the 4th Army formations, were located in the Krupki district camp, 115 km northeast of Minsk, 450 km from the border (!?))
Brest UR:
16th, 17th, 18th machine gun and artillery battalions
Brest border detachment(commander - Kuznetsov A.P.)
120 gap RGK - Kossovo
As Sandalov writes, “the troops of the 4th Army did not have an operational formation, however, the actual location of its formations by June 22, 1941 can be imagined as a formation in two echelons: the first echelon - four rifle and one tank divisions; the second echelon - one tank and one motorized division."
* * *13th Army
Commander Lieutenant General Filatov Petr Mikhailovich
Chief of Staff - Brigade Commander A.V. Petrushevsky
On June 22, the Army Headquarters was in Mogilev due to which,
113 SD and 13 MK were transferred to 10A,
49 SD was transferred to 4A
2nd Rifle Corps
(commander - Major General Ermakov A.N.) - in Minsk
100
Major General Russiyanov I.N.) - in Minsk
161
rifle division (commander - Colonel Mikhailov A.I.)
21
rifle corps(commander - Major General Borisov V.B.) in the area of Druskeniki, Yasidomlya, Skidel, Dembrovo
17
rifle division (commander - Major General Batsanov T.K.)
50
rifle division (commander - Major General Evdokimov V.P.)
37
rifle division (commander - Colonel Chekharin A.E.) - Lida district
47
rifle corps(commander - General Povetkin S.I.) - in Bobruisk
in the area of Pruzhany, Zaprudy, Kartuzbereza, Bluden
55
rifle division (commander - Colonel Ivanov D.I.) - Slutsk
121
rifle division (commander - Major General Zykov P.M.)
143
rifle division (commander - Major General Safonov D.P.)
44
rifle corps(commander - major general Yushkevich V.A.) - Baranovichi district
108
rifle division (commander - Major General Mavrichev A.I.) - district of Minsk
64
rifle division (commander - Colonel Iovlev S.I.) - district of Minsk
8
anti-tank artillery brigade (commander - Strelbitsky I.S.) - in the Lida region
7
anti-tank artillery brigade in the area of the village of Blasostowica, Grudsk, Yaluvka
17
mechanized corps(36 tanks, commander - General Petrov) - Baranovichi district
27
tank division - in Novogrudok
36
tank division - Nesvizh region
209
motorized division - in Ivye
20
mechanized corps(93 tanks) - Borisov district
26
tank division - in Minsk
38
tank division - Borisov
210
motorized division - Osipovichi
12
13
bomber division
3rd aviation corps (commander - Colonel Skripko N.S.)
4th airborne corps (commander - General Zhadov A.S.) - Pukhovichi district
Pinsk flotilla(commander - Admiral Rogachev D.D.)
Western Front Air Force
A total of 16 airfields for the base of 9, 10 and 11 gardens
Tirnovo (12 km from the border) - 131 aircraft (66 Mig-3 and 65 I-153)
Dolubovo (22 km from the border) - 83 aircraft (50 Mig-3 and 33 I-16)
Wysokie Mazowiec (16 km from the border) - 101 aircraft (70 Mig-3 and 31 I-16)
All aircraft on the ground at these airfields were destroyed.
In total, 732 aircraft were destroyed on the Western Front on the first day of the war.
| Aviation formations (mixed and bomber) | Enemy aircraft shot down | Shot down in air battles | Shot down by anti-aircraft artillery | Destroyed on earth | Didn't return from mission |
| 9 garden | 74 | 74 | - | 278 | - |
| 10 garden | 23 | 23 | - | 157 | - |
| 11 garden | 34 | 34 | - | 93 | - |
| 12 bad | - | 2 | - | - | |
| 13 bad | - | 15 | - | 46 | |
| 3rd Air Corps | 2 | 1 | - | 7 | |
| Total: | 133 | 18 | 528 | 53 |
Aviation of the Western Front |
||||||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|
| 9th garden | Bialystok (administration hell) | MiG-3, I-16 | 2/0 | 5/2 | 5 | - | - | - | - | |
| 41 IAP | Bialystok, Seburcin | MiG-3, MiG-1 | 56/14 | 27/27 | 27 | - | - | - | 16 | |
| I-16, I-15 | 22/4 | 36/18 | 36 | 25 | 25 | - | - | |||
| 124 iap | Bialystok | MiG-3 | 70/8 | 16/16 | 16 | - | - | - | 29 | |
| M.Mezowiecki | I-16 | 29/2 | 24/24 | 24 | - | - | - | - | ||
| 126 iap | Belsk, Dolubovo | MiG-3 | 50/12 | 21/21 | 21 | 4 | 4 | - | 31 | |
| I-16 | 23/10 | 42/13 | 42 | - | - | - | - | |||
| 129 iap | Zabludovo, Tarnovo village | MiG-3 | 61/5 | - | - | - | - | 34 | ||
| I-153 | 57/8 | 40/40 | 40 | 11 | 11 | - | - | |||
| 13 bap | Ros, Borisovshizna | SB, Ar-2 | 51/11 | 45/40 | 45 | 15 | 5 | - | - | |
| Pe-2 | 8/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| Total in the air division | MiG-3, MiG-1, I-16, I-15, I-153, SB, Pe-2, Ar-2 | 429/74 | 256/201 | 256 | 55 | 45 | 0 | 110 | ||
| 10th garden | Kobrin (control hell) | SB | 1/0 | 3/1 | - | - | - | - | - | |
| 33 IAP | Pruzhany | I-16 | 44/7 | 70/37 | 70 | 29 | 29 | - | - | |
| 74 hat | Pruzhany | I-153, I-15bis | 62/2 | 70/60 | 70 | 21 | 21 | - | - | |
| IL-2 | 8/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| 123 iap | Strigovo, Name Day | I-153 | 61/8 | 71/53 | 71 | 6 | 6 | - | - | |
| Yak-1 | 20/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| 39 bap | Pinsk, Zhabitsy | SB | 43/2 | 49/39 | 49 | 18 | 18 | - | - | |
| Pe-2 | 9/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, Yak-1, I-16, I-15, I-153 | 248/19 | 263/190 | 260 | 74 | 74 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 11th garden | Lida (control hell) | SB, I-16, I-153 | 4/0 | 8/4 | 8 | - | - | - | - | |
| 122 iap | Lida | I-16, I-15bis | 71/11 | 50/50 | 50 | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
| 127 iap | Skidel, Lesishche | I-153, I-15 | 72/7 | 53/53 | 53 | 39 | 21 | - | - | |
| 16 bap | Stomach, Cherlena | SB | 24/1 | 46/23 | 46 | 17 | 17 | 17 | - | |
| Pe-2 | 37/0 | - | - | - | - | 39 | ||||
| Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, I-16, I-15bis, I-153 | 208/19 | 157/130 | 157 | 61 | 43 | 17 | 39 | ||
| 12th bad | Vitebsk (administration hell) | SB | 1/0 | 4/1 | 4 | - | - | - | - | |
| 43 bap | Vitebsk | Su-2 | 46/1 | 71/33 | 33 | 26 | 26 | - | 38 | |
| 128 bap | Ulla | SB | 41/1 | 68/31 | 31 | - | - | - | 37 | |
| 6 bap | Vitebsk | SB | 18/2 | 54/16 | 25 | - | - | - | 29 | |
| 209 bap | Balbasovo, Betskoye | Su-2 | 25/1 | 3/3 | 3 | - | - | - | ||
| 215 bap | Smolensk, Travniki | I-15bis | 15/1 | 10/10 | 10 | - | - | - | ||
| Total in the air division | SB, Su-2, I-15bis | 146/6 | 210/94 | 106 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 104 | ||
| 13th bad | Bobruisk (administration hell) | SB | 1/0 | 3/1 | 3 | - | - | - | - | |
| 24 bap | Bobruisk, Teikichi, Telushe | SB | 41/6 | 49/35 | 49 | 27 | 19 | - | - | |
| 97 bap | Bobruisk | Su-2 | 51/26 | 49/25 | 25 | - | - | - | 24 | |
| 121 bap | Bykhov | SB | 56/9 | 51/39 | 39 | - | - | - | 12 | |
| 125 bap | Bykhov | SB | 38/6 | 55/32 | 43 | 11 | 11 | - | 12 | |
| 130 bap | Bobrovichi, Gnoevo | SB | 38/8 | 51/30 | 51 | 12 | 12 | - | - | |
| Total in the air division | SB, Su-2 | 225/55 | 258/162 | 210 | 50 | 42 | 0 | 48 | ||
| 43rd IAD | Balbasovo (administration hell) | I-16 | 2/0 | 4/2 | 4 | - | - | - | - | |
| 160 iap | Balbasovo, Prongeevka | I-153, I-15 | 66/5 | 75/39 | 39 | - | - | - | 36 | |
| 161 iap | Balbasovo, Zubovo | I-16 | 62/3 | 59/17 | 17 | - | - | - | 42 | |
| 162 iap | Mogilev, Yedlino | I-16 | 54/4 | 95/13 | 13 | - | - | - | 82 | |
| 163 IAP | Mogilev, Lubnice | I-16 | 59/3 | 82/10 | 10 | - | - | - | 72 | |
| Total in the air division | I-16, I-153, I-15 | 243/15 | 315/81 | 83 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 232 | ||
| 313th rap | Horsefly | SB | 20/1 | 67/20 | 38 | 12 | 5 | - | 29 | |
| 314th rap | Baranovichi | SB | 5/0 | 35/5 | 35 | - | - | - | - | |
| Yak-2, Yak-4 | 28/0 | - | - | - | - | 12 | ||||
| 161st reserve up | Lepel | I-16, I-153, I-15 | 42/8 | 65/34 | 65 | 7 | 7 | - | - | |
| 162nd reserve up | Zyabrovka, Bronnoe, Kholmich | I-16, I-153, SB | 64/8 | 76/56 | 76 | - | - | - | - | |
| Total per department up | SB, Yak-2, Yak-4, I-16, I-153, I-15 | 159/17 | 243/115 | 214 | 19 | 12 | 0 | 41 | ||
| Total for the Air Force of the military district | 1658/205 | 1702/973 | 1286 | 285 | 242 | 17 | 574 | |||
| Including new types | MiG-3, MiG-1, Yak-1, Pe-2, Il-2, Yak-2, Yak-4 | 347/39 | 64/64 | 64 | 4 | 4 | 16 1 | |||
2 - Name of deployment points
3 - Aircraft types
4 - Number of combat aircraft (denominator - including faulty aircraft)
5 - Total number of crews (denominator - including the number of combat-ready crews capable of simultaneously taking to the air to carry out a combat mission, depending on the availability of serviceable combat aircraft and combat-ready crews in the aviation regiments)
6-10 - Crews prepared for combat operations:
6 - during the day in normal weather conditions
7 - at night in normal weather conditions
8 - during the day in difficult weather conditions
9 - at night in difficult weather conditions
10 - retrained or commissioned upon arrival from colleges
In the spring of 1944, with the Red Army reaching the state border in certain directions, the country's top military-political leadership decided to create new fronts in new theaters of war, as well as to reorganize and rename the fronts that were part of the Red Army at the beginning of 1944.
Some facts suggest that the reasons for the reorganization of individual Red Army associations were their extremely unsuccessful actions in the military campaign of 1943.
At the beginning of April 1944. Stalin, having received a huge amount of information about the extremely unsuccessful activities of the command of the then Western Front, decided to send a representative delegation there to study the more detailed situation on the spot consisting of GKO member Malenkov (chairman), Colonel General Shcherbakov, Colonel General Shtemenko, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov and Lieutenant General Shimonaev.
Based on the results of the work of the GKO Commission on the Western Front, a devastating, detailed report was soon prepared addressed to Stalin, dated April 11, 1944, No. M-715.
Here are some of the most interesting sections from this report:
I. Unsatisfactory military operations of the Western Front over the past six months:
Starting from October 12, 1943 to April 1, 1944, the Western Front, under the command of Army General Sokolovsky, carried out eleven operations in the Orsha and Vitebsk directions, namely:
Orsha operation October 12-18, 1943
Orsha operation October 21-26, 1943
Orsha operation November 14-19, 1943
Orsha operation November 30 - December 2, 1943
Vitebsk operation December 23, 1943 - January 6, 1944
Bogushevsky operation January 8-24, 1944
Vitebsk operation February 3-16, 1944
Private operation in the Orsha direction February 22-25, 1944
Vitebsk operation February 29 - March 5, 1944
Orsha operation March 5-9, 1944
Bogushevskaya operation March 21-29, 1944
All these operations ended unsuccessfully, and the front did not solve the tasks set by Headquarters. In none of the listed operations was the enemy’s defense broken through, at least to its tactical depth; the operation ended, at best, with an insignificant penetration into the enemy’s defense with large losses of our troops.
In these fruitless operations in the period from October 12, 1943 to April 1, 1944, in the areas of active operations alone, the front suffered losses in killed - 62,326 people, wounded - 219,419 people, and a total of 281,745 people killed and wounded. If we add to this the losses on passive sectors of the front, then during the period from October 1943 to April 1944, the Western Front lost 330,587 people. In addition, during the same time, 53,283 sick people were admitted to hospitals from the troops of the Western Front.
In the above operations from October 1943 to April 1944, the Western Front expended a very large amount of ammunition, namely 7261 wagons. During the year, from March 1943 to March 1944, the front used up 16,661 wagons of ammunition. During the same time, i.e. per year. The Belorussian Front used 12,335 wagons, the 1st Ukrainian Front - 10,945 wagons. 4th Ukrainian Front - 8463 wagons, and each of the other fronts used up less ammunition than the listed fronts. Thus, the Western Front used up much more ammunition than any other front.
The unsuccessful actions of the Western Front over the past six months, large losses and high consumption of ammunition are explained not by the presence of a strong enemy and insurmountable defense in front of the front, but solely by unsatisfactory leadership on the part of the front command. During all operations, the Western Front always had a significant superiority in forces and means over the enemy, allowing, of course, to count on success.
In the photo, a convoy of vehicles guarded by an armored car delivers ammunition to the front line. Western Front spring 1943
II. Major shortcomings in the work of artillery
In the 33rd, 31st and 5th armies there were repeated cases when artillery fired at areas (squares) given by the army artillery headquarters, but in fact there were no targets in these squares and the artillery fired at an empty place, and our infantry was shot enemy firing points from other areas.
In the operation of the 33rd Army on December 23, 1943, at the observation posts of some artillery regiments there were not officers, but ordinary soldiers. Not everywhere there were observers in the first echelon of infantry. As a result of this, the 199th Rifle Division was fired upon by its own artillery. In the same division, it came to the point that direct fire guns were firing at their own infantry.
During the offensive of the 33rd Army on February 3 this year. in a number of divisions the interaction of artillery with infantry was not organized. So, for example, the 144th Infantry Division advanced on Pavlyuchenki, and the artillery supporting it fired west of Pavlyuchenki. At the same time, during the offensive of the 222nd Rifle Division, the artillery supporting it was silent.
The unsatisfactory performance of the artillery on the Western Front is evidenced by many testimonies of captured Germans.
Artillery preparation is carried out according to a template. The beginning of the artillery preparation was indicated by a PC salvo, followed by a period of destruction and, at the end, an artillery raid along the front edge. The enemy got used to this pattern and, knowing the order of fire, skillfully preserved his manpower in shelters. Due to the fact that during the period of artillery preparation our artillery, as a rule, fired across the squares and did not suppress the enemy’s fire system, our infantry was met by the enemy with organized fire of all types, suffered heavy losses and in many cases could not advance forward from the very beginning.
III. Weaknesses in planning and preparation of operations
In some operations, rifle divisions and reinforcements were brought into battle on the move. In the operation of the 5th Army on February 22-25, the 184th Infantry Division on the night of February 21 surrendered its defense sector to the 158th Infantry Division and by the morning of February 22nd reached the initial position for the offensive and from 8.00 of the same day, after a 10-minute artillery attack, moved into offensive and, of course, was not successful. In the operation of the 33rd Army on February 3-16, the 222nd, 164th, 144th and 215th rifle divisions received 1,500 reinforcements on the eve of the offensive and brought them into battle the next morning. The officers who arrived for replenishment received their units at their starting position, and a few hours later led them on the offensive.
IV. On the incorrect formation of battle formations during an offensive
In most operations carried out by the front, the armies, especially the 33rd Army, advanced, deeply echeloned their battle formations, and created an excessive density of manpower, thereby violating the order of Headquarters No. 306. Such formation of battle formations led to the fact that the division attacked 2-3 battalions, and the remaining battalions stood at the back of the head. Under these conditions, the striking force of the division was not used simultaneously, but was expended in parts and fire assets were frozen. All this led to large losses even before the troops entered the battle, and having suffered such losses and being under continuous fire, the units lost their combat effectiveness even before the battle.
V. On the disadvantages of using tanks
Contrary to the experience of the war and the instructions of the Headquarters on the use of tank formations, the command of the Western Front threw its existing 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps against the undefeated enemy defenses, as a result of which the tank corps could not advance forward and suffered heavy losses. In the operation in the Orsha direction on November 14-19, the tank corps was brought into battle when the infantry on a 3 km front barely penetrated the defense to a depth of 2-3 km. In the operation of the 33rd Army in the Vitebsk direction on December 23, the entry of the tank corps into battle was planned after the infantry captured the river. Luchesa (18 km deep in defense). On this basis, the tank corps was not brought into battle when the infantry advanced in the first three days of the offensive to a depth of 8-10 km, and when the infantry was stopped by organized enemy fire from pre-prepared lines and the river continued to remain ahead. Luchesa, the tank corps rushes into battle and, after losing 60 tanks, without achieving success, is withdrawn to the infantry battle formations. In the operation in the Bogushevsky direction on January 8, the tank corps was brought into battle when the infantry essentially had no success. Having suffered up to 70% losses, the tank corps advanced with the infantry 2-4 km and was then withdrawn from the battle.
VIII. On the situation in the 33rd Army during the command of Colonel General Gordov
Contrary to the instructions of the Headquarters, which prohibited the use of special units in battle like ordinary infantry, Gordov often brought scouts, chemists and sappers into battle.
Among the most serious offenses of Gordov are the facts when Gordov sent the entire officer corps of the division and corps into a chain.
In his order dated September 4, 1943, addressed to the commander of the 173rd Infantry Division, Colonel Zaitsev, and the regimental commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Milovanov, Lieutenant Colonel Sizov, and Major Guslitser, Gordov demanded:
“Place the entire officer corps in battle formations and march through the forest in a chain, assigning small detachments to flush out the machine gunners from their nests.”
And further Gordov wrote in the order: “It is better for us to be killed today than not to complete the task.”
On September 4, 1943, Gordov ordered the chief of staff of the 70th infantry regiment, Major General Ikonnikov:
“Immediately send the entire corps administration into chain. Leave only the chief of the operations department at headquarters.”
Such unacceptable actions by Gordov led to disorganization of battle control and unjustifiable losses among the officers. Over the past six months, in the 33rd Army under the command of Gordov, 4 division commanders, 8 deputy division commanders and division chiefs of staff, 38 regiment commanders and their deputies, and 174 battalion commanders were killed and wounded.
in the photo Colonel General V.N. Gordov
Gordov criminally violated the order of the Headquarters prohibiting the execution of commanders without trial. So, on March 6, on the orders of Gordov, Major Trofimov was shot without trial or investigation, allegedly for evading battle. In fact, as the investigation established, Major Trofimov was not guilty.
During the fighting, Gordov's control was reduced to swearing and insults. Gordov often resorted to threats of execution towards his subordinates. This was the case with the commander of the 277th Infantry Division, Major General Gladyshev, and the commander of the 45th Infantry Division, Major General Poplavsky. According to a number of commanders who worked with Gordov, the inhumane attitude towards people and sheer hysteria tormented them so much that there were cases when commanders could not command their formations and units.
The front command ignored all these outrages in Gordov’s actions, did not correct him and continued to consider him the best army commander.
IX. About the front command
The front command does not tolerate criticism; attempts to criticize shortcomings are met with hostility. Characteristic in this regard are the resolutions of Army General Sokolovsky on the report of an officer of the General Staff, which highlighted the shortcomings of the preparation and management of the operation carried out by the 31st Army on October 29, 1943. These resolutions are as follows:
"The price of the document is very small, even on a good market day."
“Lieutenant Colonel Nekrasov, apparently, did not think about what he was writing. The man, apparently, was used to chatting in general.”
"Lies!"
"Stupid lie."
"Lies".
“The writer does not understand the battle to break through the defense at all.”
"Words and no more!"
Such an atmosphere has been created at the front and people are so educated that they are afraid to raise questions about shortcomings with the front command. There were timid attempts on the part of individual commanders of the military branches to point out shortcomings in the actions of the military branches and address them in the order, but the front commander rejected such attempts.
The front commander, Comrade Sokolovsky, is cut off from his closest assistants - the commanders of the military branches and the heads of services; he does not receive them for many days and does not resolve their issues. Some deputy commanders were not aware of the missions of their respective branches of the military in connection with the operations being carried out, not to mention the fact that they were not involved in the development of the operations. For example: the commander of the BT and MB, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Rodin, stated: “I have never been asked how best to use tanks. I am only a dispatcher and send tanks to one army or another. I learned the tasks of tank forces in the armies or from subordinate tankers."
Soon, based on the results of the commission’s work, an Order was issued by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for No. 220076 dated April 12, 1944
This order read:
Based on the GKO decree of April 12, 1944 on the work of the command and headquarters of the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ORDERS:
I.
1. Army General Sokolovsky should be removed from the post of commander of the Western Front, as having failed to command the front, and appointed him chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
2. Lieutenant General Bulganin be reprimanded for the fact that, being a long time member of the Military Council of the Western Front, he did not report to Headquarters about the presence of major shortcomings at the front.
3. Warn Lieutenant General Pokrovsky, chief of staff of the Western Front, that if he does not correct his mistakes, he will be demoted in rank and position.
4. Colonel General of the Artillery Camera is removed from his post as commander of the artillery of the Western Front and placed at the disposal of the commander of the artillery of the Red Army.
5. Colonel Ilnitsky should be removed from his post as head of the intelligence department of the Western Front headquarters, demoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned to another job with a demotion.
6. Warn Colonel General Gordov, removed from his post as commander of the 33rd Army, that if he repeats the mistakes he made in the 33rd Army, he will be reduced in rank and position.
II.
1. The Western Front in its current composition is divided into two fronts: the 2nd Belorussian Front consisting of the 31st, 49th and 50th armies and the 3rd Belorussian Front consisting of the 39th, 33rd and 5th armies.
The Directorate of the 2nd Belorussian Front will be formed on the basis of the Directorate of the 10th Army. Complete the formation and accept troops assigned to the front no later than April 25.
2. The current Belorussian Front should be called the 1st Belorussian Front.
3. Appoint Colonel General Petrov as commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front with his release from command of the 33rd Army; appoint Lieutenant General Mekhlis as a member of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front; chief of staff - Lieutenant General Bogolyubov with his release from the post of chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
4. Appoint Colonel General Chernyakhovsky as commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front with his release from command of the 60th Army; appoint Major General Makarov as a member of the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front with his release from the post of head of the Political Directorate of the Western Front; chief of staff - Lieutenant General Pokrovsky with his release from the post of chief of staff of the Western Front.
5. Appoint Lieutenant General Kryuchenkin as commander of the 33rd Army with his release from command of the 69th Army.
6. The formation of two fronts and the distribution of divisions, reinforcement units, aviation, rear units, institutions and property of the Western Front between the two fronts should be carried out under the control of the representative of the Headquarters, Colonel General Shtemenko.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
Stalin
Antonov http://www.forum-tvs.ru/index.php?showtopic=96392
This is the history of the creation of the Victory Fronts, the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. The Western Front remained in the history of the Great Patriotic War as a front associated mainly with the severe defeats and losses suffered by the Red Army in the initial period of the war.
